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Abstract 
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Policy in the current programming period of 2007-2013 by examining the 
evolution of the concept in terms of its definition and conceptual framework, 
analysing the current processes of implementing Multi-Level Governance in the 
EU27, as well as describing the advantages and disadvantages of partnerships 
in policy-making. Moreover, the study aims to formulate strategic and 
operational recommendations in the context of the preparation of the 2014-
2020 programming period. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Objective of this study 
The concept of “Multi-Level Governance” (MLG) has increasingly become a key aspect 
shaping policy-making at EU level. The management of a union of 27 Member States (and, 
since June 2013, 28 Member States) with different political systems and traditions, 
implementing 368 European Regional Development Fund (ERDF), Cohesion Fund (CF) and 
European Social Fund (ESF) programmes with a total budget of approximately €347 bn. in 
fact relies on a complex system of coordination and cooperation of different types of actors 
at various government levels. Most recently, the Europe 2020 Strategy therefore 
emphasizes the need for an “integrated approach” which points to the need for cooperation 
and coordination of efforts between the European Commission and the Member States with 
all its administrative levels and civil society.   
 
The purpose of this study is primarily to offer a thorough overview of MLG in Cohesion 
Policy in the current programming period of 2007-2013. As a starting point, this task 
requires a definition of the concept of MLG given that there is no commonly agreed 
definition and the literature and theories about MLG are vast. The present study 
understands MLG as the participation of a range of different types of actors (public, 
private and societal) in policy-making and implementation through formal and 
informal means. 
 
In addition to examining the evolution of the theoretical concept of MLG, the purpose of 
this study is to analyse the current processes of implementing MLG in the EU27, as well as 
describing the advantages and disadvantages of partnerships in policy-making. In view of 
drawing strategic and operational recommendations in the context of the preparation of the 
2014-2020 programming period, the study analyses the trade-off between MLG and the 
effectiveness and efficiency of Cohesion Policy based on findings from desk research as well 
as a comparative analysis of nine different ERDF Operational Programmes (OPs). Each case 
study is based on a documentary analysis as well as interviews with the Managing Authority 
(MA), a programme partner at horizontal or vertical level, a member of the Monitoring 
Committee (MC) as well as one to two project promoters. The case studies help extending 
the theoretical background. The findings and concrete examples from these case studies 
are also included in the narrative or in boxes. 
 
Origins and development of MLG 
The term MLG originates in Gary Marks’ effort in the early 1990s to capture the 
developments in Cohesion Policy and challenge the dominant theoretical approaches to 
understanding the nature of the EU as a political system. The concept is the attempt to pin 
down the presence and influence of supranational institutions and sub-national 
actors in the EU policy process, which had become a central feature of decision-making 
in Cohesion Policy after the landmark 1988 reform. It followed the already established idea 
of the subsidiarity principle, i.e. sharing powers between several levels of authority and 
ensuring that decisions are taken at the most effective level.  Since the original formulation 
of MLG, the literature has mushroomed over the 1990’s and 2000s. The concept and 
theoretical framework gradually developed as decision-making competencies were 
increasingly shared by actors at different levels (EU, national, sub-national) rather than 
controlled by state executives. With time, MLG theories increasingly encompassed more 
and more types of non-state actors based on the introduction of new, inclusive, EU policies 
(e.g. Environmental policy) and the acceleration of regionalisation processes. 
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The contributions of MLG to the effectiveness and legitimacy of policy-making have become 
increasingly important issues for EU policymakers (e.g. through the development of a “MLG 
Performance Scoreboard” by the Committee of the Regions in 2012). This resulted in 
more and more theoretical debates about various modes of interaction between the 
different types of actors as well as administrative levels involved in policy-making.  
 
In a similar way, the definitional status of MLG has received increasing attention in parallel 
to policy developments at EU level, especially the constitutional reform initiatives in the 
2000s. Despite the lack of a commonly agreed definition, MLG is generally understood as 
the participation of a range of different types of actors (public, private and 
societal) in policy-making and implementation through formal and informal 
means. The latter understanding is used in the present study.  
 
MLG in Cohesion Policy 
In the context of EU Cohesion Policy, MLG particularly relied on the implementation of the 
partnership principle. The partnership principle was codified as a regulatory requirement 
under the 1988 reform, requiring the involvement of regional and local authorities in 
programme formulation and implementation for the first time. Since then, the regulations 
have gradually extended the scope of the partnership principle by specifying a role for 
economic and social partners within the framework of national rules and practice (1993 
reform), the need to involve authorities responsible for the environment and for the 
promotion of gender equality (1999 reform) and Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) 
and civil society bodies (2006 reform). In short, the formal regulatory requirements on the 
partnership principle have evolved from Multi-level Government to Multi-level Governance.  
 
The first attempt to analyse MLG across distinct policy phases dates back to a study in 
1996 (Hooghe) which showed that sub-national influence in all countries was greatest 
during programme implementation/monitoring, followed by the design of 
plans/programmes, and least influential in negotiations with the Commission.  
 
The literature shows that MLG can, under the right conditions, contribute inter alia to 
greater policy effectiveness in all aspects of programme implementation; to greater 
legitimacy and transparency in decision-making processes; as well as to a greater 
commitment and ownership of programme outputs. These advantages however largely 
depend on the existence of factors such as, inter alia, prior experience of partnership 
working as well as an accommodation with national institutional, administrative and cultural 
traditions. The uneven practice of partnership principle implementation across Member 
States and programmes implied that there was significant scope for improvements in a 
range of aspects. Five key challenges related to the implementation of MLG have been 
identified in previous research:  
 
• Experience: The application of the partnership principle was hampered by a lack of 
tradition of decentralization and collaborative policy-making, as well as a limited 
capacity of sub-national actors, especially in the New Member States. 
• Lack of resources: A general criticism across all Member States is that the extent 
of involvement and influence of non-public sector bodies in OP decision-making 
processes remains limited due to a lack of resources, challenges which are 
compounded by the complexity of Cohesion Policy rules.  
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• Managerial conflicts: Another challenge is the growing resentment and conflict 
between the European Commission and regional authorities as the role of the 
Commission has evolved over time, from regulatory compliance (1989-93) to 
financial inputs, monitoring, control and audit (1994-2006) and, subsequently, to 
the strategic coordination level (2007-2013). A role that is likely to be strengthened 
in the post-2013 period. The regions may perceive the increased role of the 
Commission as rising interference. 
• The rising complexity of bureaucracy: A frequent criticism of Cohesion Policy is 
the high administrative costs of the MLG model.  The higher the number of actors 
involved, the more complex the administration behind policy development and 
implementation. 
• A democratic deficit: Finally, another strand of the literature on MLG examines the 
democratic and legitimacy implications of Cohesion Policy implementation. It looks 
at the possibility that a top–down and technocratic model marginalises the role of 
democratic institutions.  
 
MLG in the policy cycle – a comparative analysis of the case studies 
MLG requirements in Cohesion Policy are codified in the partnership principle. Partnership 
covers the preparation, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of operational 
programmes. Based on an in-depth analysis of the experience of MLG in Cohesion Policy in 
2007-2013 in nine ERDF OPs, the actors involved, the mechanisms used to facilitate the 
cooperation, as well as the main advantages and disadvantages of involving multiple actors 
across the distinct policy phases are analysed.  
 
Preparation of the OP 
In this phase, participation is most integrative. In all of the OPs examined, the preparation 
process involved close cooperation and consultation with government ministries, 
departments and agencies at both national and regional levels.  The most autonomous 
role of the regions in OP development could be seen in the OP North-Rhine Westphalia 
(Germany being a federal state) followed by the OP North East England. While the role of 
regional-level actors was important in the remaining OPs, there was generally a stronger 
coordination role at national level (the strongest national role being identified in the OP 
Castilla y Leon).  
 
In all OPs analysed, local governments, economic and social partners, environmental and 
gender equality bodies, NGOs and civil society groups were involved in the preparation 
process. The mechanisms to engage these partners included OP working groups, 
thematic working groups, targeted meetings for specific actors and/or larger stakeholder 
events, as well as public consultations of draft OPs.  While it is difficult to quantify the 
relative impact of individual partners through these different mechanisms, the documentary 
analysis and interviews across the different OPs suggests the following general ranking of 
participation and influence by the key actors in programming: 1) High: Government 
bodies at national and/or regional level; 2) Medium: environmental and gender equality 
bodies, local government, economic and social partners; 3) Low: NGOs and civil society 
organisations.  
 
The main advantages of partnership in this phase are the facilitation of buy-in, consensus 
and collective ownership as well as the additional expertise contributing to improving the 
quality of the OP. These, however, largely depend and rely on the pre-existence of a 
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culture of cooperation, a clear division of competences and adequate planning. The main 
difficulties identified were the varied and vested nature of partners’ interests; the 
insufficient strategic dialogue and the lack of flexibility for accommodating partners’ 
opinions; as well as administrative capacity and coordination constraints interlinked with 
the lack of financial and human resources as well as knowledge about EU funds. 
Project selection 
Project selection is a Member State’s responsibility and is not formally regulated by the 
partnership principle. However, there is a requirement for the OP project selection criteria 
to be approved by the MC, which includes representation from the key partners. Despite 
this formal requirement, OP partnership members - especially non-state actors – often 
have limited influence on the project selection criteria and are not collectively 
involved in the selection of projects in most of the cases. 
Partnership-working can also occur at the level of individual projects, which may involve 
multiple partners in the application and implementation of collaborative projects of a public-
public, private-private or public-private nature. 
 
Programme Management 
The key OP management bodies are the MA, Certification Authority and Audit Authority. 
MAs are formally responsible for the key programme management tasks and they are 
integrated into government ministries or agencies at national or regional level. The 
Certification and Audit Authorities are responsible for certifying/paying funds to 
beneficiaries and auditing systems and expenditure respectively. The Certification and Audit 
Authorities are usually located at the same level as the MAs. 
 
There are variations in management structures; the number of actors involved and the 
delegation of tasks to intermediate bodies across the OPs, reflecting the flexibility allowed 
in the Structural Funds Regulations; the nature of OPs and domestic institutional 
arrangements. 
 
There were mixed views on the benefits of shared or delegated management in the OP 
management. Among the main MLG benefits identified were the contributions to effective 
management, policy coordination, and improving commitment and ownership. Actions that 
are considered to contribute to effective MLG in OP management are regular information 
exchange and targeted training measures. Negative features of MLG were also identified 
in terms of diffusing or separating management responsibilities and coordination 
challenges. These challenges are mainly linked to increased administrative burden, a lack of 
clear guidance and shifts of responsibility. 
 
The interviews with project Lead Partners generally showed that the involvement of 
different partners in the management of projects was essential and worked well, both in 
terms of cooperation with the project partners and OP authorities. However, there were 
financial management, coordination and communication challenges in a number of cases, 
especially with regards to coordinating the necessary administrative requirements between 
the various partners involved and the OP administrators. 
 
Monitoring 
The main partnership mechanism for the monitoring of programmes is the MC. The 
composition of the MCs is decided by the Member State and MA. While there is an 
expectation to include the full list of partners specified in the partnership principle, in 
practice there is discretion in the type and number of actors that are allocated places in the 
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MCs. The decisions taken in the Committee are, in most cases, adopted consensually rather 
than through formal voting procedures.  
 
The main benefit of the MC from a MLG perspective is to support the strategic dialogue 
among partners and contribute to a shared ownership of the programme.  
 
More negative views were however expressed about the nature of the dialogue in MC 
meetings and the decision-making process: Interviewees have reported a lack of strategic 
dialogue describing the MC meetings as a “platform for presenting information on statistics” 
rather than a platform for debate. Also, OP partners are reported to have a limited 
influence on decisions, debating on what seem to be “pre-decided” issues. Finally, 
organisational challenges arise from the involvement of multiple heterogeneous partners 
and the subsequent increase in the complexity of the meetings, hampering decision-making 
processes. The MC outputs - such as implementation reports - are widely appreciated as a 
valuable accountability tool for exchanging information on OP implementation outcomes. 
However, there seem to be other structures and networks outside of the MC that contribute 
to MLG goals just as much, if not more, according to the interviewees.  
 
Evaluation 
The Cohesion Policy requirements on evaluation have become more flexible for 2007-2013. 
Obligatory mid-term evaluation was replaced with ongoing needs-based evaluation to 
assess performance and react to external changes. Operational evaluations are triggered 
automatically when difficulties are revealed by monitoring systems and in order to justify 
programme revisions. While evaluations have been undertaken for most of the OPs during 
the 2007-2013 period, none have assessed MLG arrangements or the partnership 
principle.  In addition to internet platforms and evaluation events, the main forum for the 
involvement of partners in evaluation is the Monitoring Committee. Dedicated evaluation 
committees and networks have been established in several of the OPs reviewed, but the 
membership of these groups is usually restricted to government Ministries, departments 
and MAs rather than the broader partnership of OP stakeholders. 
 
Conclusions and recommendations 
Based on a thorough review of MLG implementation in Cohesion Policy as well as the 
principle’s positive and negative impacts on the effectiveness of policy-making, this study 
draws recommendations in view of ensuring a more effective application of MLG in 2014-
2020.   
 
First, despite the perceived intensification of the partnership principle in the OPs, decision-
making is in practice still dominated by a top-down perspective. The decisions are taken 
by the key players (EU, government authorities at national and/or regional levels) and are 
merely informed by the sub-national level with uneven and often limited involvement of 
civil society actors and NGOs. Nevertheless, the European Commission should further act as 
a supporting and advising entity.  The European Parliament should therefore encourage the 
European Commission to offer more technical support to OP authorities in order to facilitate 
partnerships (e.g. trainings) as well as disseminate good practices.  
 
In order to do so, the key is for the European Commission to continuously follow the 
developments “on the ground” in order to truly grasp the circumstances and the difficulties 
of involving numerous different partners in the OPs. Eventually, this will help the European 
institutions developing comprehensive solutions to ensure that MLG contributes to the 
Policy Department B: Structural and Cohesion Policies 
 
 
12 
 
effectiveness of Cohesion Policy diminishing any trade-offs. In order to avoid the 
strengthening of top-down approaches, the European Institutions should ensure that 
sufficient time is planned for an early engagement with all partners and stakeholders 
especially at the outset of a new programming period, without putting any additional 
administrative pressure on OP authorities.  
 
Given that some OPs were not able to name projects that involved more than one partner 
(namely the project leader), the EU Institutions should ensure the partnership principle is 
taken to all levels of programme implementation including projects. 
 
Second, an over-representation of actors that are not accountable to the groups 
represented is counter-productive.  The inclusiveness of partnership should be ensured but 
the European Parliament should inform the European Commission that OP authorities must 
be able to target and consult those partners whom they consider to be most relevant for 
the tasks and issues at stake. This will be facilitated through the higher thematic 
concentration of the programmes in the next programming period 2014-2020. The OP 
structure and divisions of tasks should be determined in the OP preparation phase in order 
to avoid responsibility shifting.  
 
The European Parliament should also ask the European Commission to offer enough 
support for ensuring that active participation is encouraged, possibly through a targeted 
consultation of relevant stakeholders for specific topics or issues (e.g. thematic seminars or 
electronic consultations). The level of knowledge about the European Structural and 
Investment (ESI-)funds in general and the OP in specific should be comparable for all 
relevant stakeholders involved (e.g. trainings possibly by thematic field or technical issue). 
 
Third, the involvement of more partners of different types increases the administrative 
burden and bureaucratic complexity of policy-making (combined with a lack of 
resources experienced by many partners). The European Parliament should ask the 
European Commission to find common solutions together with OP authorities for offering 
more technical support to partners (coordination and support with administrative tasks). 
Information and knowledge gaps should be reduced in order for the partners to work with 
the same type and level of information. The communication between the OP authorities and 
the programme partners must be improved in order to ensure that all relevant stakeholders 
develop a familiarity with the programme and get a feeling of ownership. Possible models 
should be developed by the European Commission based on good practice examples. 
 
Fourth, although partnership is welcome by all actors, the case studies show that the MC is 
generally not viewed as the best platform for shaping decision-making processes. 
An ‘over-crowding’ of the MC should however also be avoided as the participation of OP 
partners has in some cases been qualified as a reflection of vested interests.  Therefore, 
the European Parliament should inform the European Commission of these developments in 
order for the latter to encourage OP authorities to introduce other channels and platforms 
in addition to the MC meetings. These platforms should be targeted only at relevant 
stakeholders and possibly tackle specific topics (e.g. thematic seminars). 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
The principle of applying “Multi-Level Governance” (MLG) in Cohesion Policy has 
increasingly been supported at EU level over the past programming periods. Managing a 
union of 27 Member States (and, since June 2013, 28 Member States) with different 
political systems and traditions, implementing 368 European Regional Development Fund 
(ERDF), Cohesion Fund (CF) and European Social Fund (ESF) programmes relies on a 
complex system of coordination and cooperation of a large number of different actors at 
various administrative levels.  
 
Since the original formulation of the concept of MLG in the early 1990s, the MLG literature 
has mushroomed. The widening definition of the concept and identification of different 
types of MLG over time has partly been a response to the increased involvement of non-
state actors in policy-making. Despite the lack of a commonly agreed definition, the present 
study defines MLG as the participation of a range of different types of actors (public, 
private and societal) in policy-making and implementation through formal and 
informal means.  
 
The purpose of this study is to offer a thorough overview of MLG in Cohesion Policy in the 
current programming period of 2007-2013 by examining the evolution of the concept in 
terms of its definition and conceptual framework, analysing the current processes of 
implementing MLG in the EU27, as well as describing the advantages and disadvantages of 
partnerships in policy-making. Moreover, the study aims to formulate strategic and 
operational recommendations in the context of the preparation of the 2014-2020 
programming period. 
 
The methodological approach is based on various “tools”, namely a literature review and 
nine case studies based on phone interviews, desk-based analysis as well as several 
questionnaires. In view of analysing the trade-off between MLG and the effectiveness and 
efficiency of Cohesion Policy, the case studies help extending the theoretical background by 
examining the implementation of MLG in nine different ERDF Operational Programmes 
(OPs) across the various stages of the policy cycle. The findings and concrete examples 
from these case studies are also used in the narrative or in boxes. 
 
The present study is divided into six chapters. A background chapter describes the origins 
and the developments of MLG revisiting its definition, conceptual framework and perceived 
impact on the effectiveness and legitimacy of Cohesion Policy. Next, the application of MLG 
in Cohesion Policy is described first, in general, based on a literature review and 
subsequently by policy phase, based on a comparative analysis of the application of 
partnership in the nine OPs analysed. Finally, the study describes the future developments 
at Member State level focusing on the nine case studies analysed, followed by a summary 
of the main findings from this study along with recommendations. 
 
The study primarily addresses EU legislators as well as actors involved in Cohesion Policy at 
all administrative levels. This includes Members of European Parliament (MEPs) and EU 
officials directly or indirectly involved in the planning of the 2014-2020 programming 
period, the authorities involved in the management of European Structural and Investment 
(ESI-)Funds at national level as well as at OP level, strategic bodies, and other partners 
involved in Cohesion Policy (civil society, economic and social partners, etc.). 
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2 METHODOLOGY 
Given the vast amount of literature that has been produced on MLG in general and on MLG 
in Cohesion Policy, in particular over the past 25 years, and due to the vagueness of the 
concept itself, a literature review features an essential part of the present study. This 
theoretical background is complemented by the results of a comparative analysis of nine 
case studies analysing how MLG is applied in practice in nine different ERDF OPs. The 
findings and conclusions of this report are informed by the combination of the results from 
the comparative analysis of the case studies as well as the literature review. This section 
describes the approaches taken to the single methodological tools in more detail. 
2.1 Literature review 
An in-depth literature review was carried out to produce a descriptive overview of how MLG 
is applied in Cohesion Policy, focusing on the questions outlined in the study’s Terms of 
Reference. In view of defining the concept of governance and MLG, the literature review 
covers academic literature about MLG (theory, application, discussions). The literature 
review also covers existing publically-available EU-level information on the realisation of 
MLG, relevant academic literature, and evaluations at Member State and regional level 
where available. It should be noted that the available material focuses most heavily on the 
current programme period, and that there is much more material available on some 
Member States than others. For example, while the EU15 Member States have already 
been applying MLG in policy-making in the earliest programming periods (since 1988), the 
EU10+2 Member States have started applying the concept of partnership since accession 
(in the mid-2000s). 
2.2 Case studies  
2.2.1 Objective 
As detailed in the Terms of Reference, the study involves the selection and analysis of 9 
regional/national/European Territorial Cooperation (ETC) OPs, resulting in the 
production of nine case study reports which are included in Annex 2 of this study. 
 
The objective of the case studies is to complement or advance the theoretical literature 
analysis with real-life examples from ERDF OPs. The main idea has been to identify the 
patterns of interactions between various actors involved in the preparation, implementation 
and monitoring/evaluation of an OP at different levels of administration. As a result, it was 
possible to assess how this interaction helped achieving the goal of sustainable 
development.  
 
The empirical research differentiated between the following phases of policy 
implementation: 
 
• Preparation/programming of the OP  
• Project selection 
• Programme management 
• Monitoring  
• Evaluation 
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2.2.2 Desk research 
The case studies are partly based on desk research using the OPs, Annual Implementation 
Reports, evaluations, and specific ex ante assessments (when relevant and available), as 
well as EU-level material.  
2.2.3 Field research 
The case studies are mainly based on 2 different questionnaires and 2-3 phone 
interviews per OP. 
 
1. A generic questionnaire has been sent to a member of the MC 
2. A phone interview has been carried out with the MA of the national / regional / 
European Territorial Cooperation (ETC) OP analysed.  
3. A phone interview has been carried out with a partner of a different horizontal 
and/or different vertical level, relevant for the respective OP.  
4. A generic questionnaire has been sent to the lead partner(s) of the project(s) 
recommended by the OP authorities to be good examples of partnership projects (1-
2 projects per OP).  
 
In brief, these aforementioned interviewees have been asked about the following issues: 
 
1. The involvement of different partners in each policy phase 
2. The extent, manner and quality of involvement in each policy phase 
3. (Self-)assessment of involvement (possibility of gaining ownership of the 
programme; effectiveness of intervention; efficiency of the process of involvement) 
4. Quality of governance by the current Cohesion Policy interventions 
5. Progress in creating long-term partnerships with civil society stakeholders 
6. Involvement of private partners as well as civil society representatives across policy 
phases 
7. Degree of efficiency and effectiveness for MLG management and partnership 
approaches across policy phases 
 
The project Lead Partners were similarly asked to express their opinion about the 
effectiveness and efficiency of the cooperation with their partners as well as the OP 
authorities in each policy phase. 
2.2.4 Selection of case studies 
Annex 1 includes a table with the final case study selection including the interviewees and 
projects chosen by OP. The approach to the selection of case study OPs has been informed 
by the need to select a sample which represents: 
 
• a geographic balance,  
• different Cohesion Policy objectives (e.g. convergence, competitiveness and 
employment, territorial cooperation),  
• different forms of constitutional frameworks (centralised unitary, decentralised 
unitary, regional unitary, federal states), and  
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• various dates of EU accession (3 ‘new’ Member States were to be covered according 
to the Terms of Reference).  
2.3 Comparative analysis of the case studies 
A comparative analysis of the case studies was then carried out in order to get a thorough 
insight about the following factors (where applicable) in each policy phase: 
 
• The actors and government levels involved 
• The mechanisms used to involve these various partners 
• The influence of these actors on the OP in that particular phase 
• The advantages of involving numerous different partners in that particular phase 
• The challenges and disadvantages of involving numerous different partners in that 
particular phase 
 
In order to accentuate the differences between across the case studies, some tables have 
been developed to graphically illustrate the narrative analysis (e.g. matrix showing the 
variations in the composition of the MCs; matrix showing the variations of the 
administrative levels involved in the key OP management bodies). The project level was 
analysed in the relevant phases (Project selection and Programme management).  
 
The findings from the comparative analysis are accompanied by boxes with illustrative 
examples from the case studies. Examples from the case studies are moreover used 
throughout the study to illustrate the narrative and offer good practice examples. 
2.4 Drawing conclusions and recommendations 
The concluding parts of this study are based on the theoretical background which builds on 
the literature review and concerns the EU27 in general as well as the findings from the in-
depth reviews of the nine OPs. In addition to describing the future plans and lessons 
learned ‘on the ground’, a matrix has been developed to summarise the advantages, 
disadvantages and challenges as well as the mechanisms of MLG across policy-cycles. The 
tools used in this study come together this way to draw informed recommendations for the 
EU institutions. 
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3 ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT OF MULTI-LEVEL 
GOVERNANCE 
 
The term MLG originated in the early 1990s, coined by Gary Marks to capture 
developments in Cohesion Policy and challenge the dominant theoretical approaches to 
understanding the nature of the EU as a political system (Marks 1992; 1993). In particular, 
Marks argued that state-centric theories of European policy-making were unable to 
recognize or explain the presence and influence of supranational institutions and sub-
national actors in the EU policy process, which had become a central feature of decision-
making in Cohesion Policy following the landmark 1988 reform.  
 
Looking beyond Cohesion Policy to the EU political system more generally, a more 
elaborated MLG model by Marks and his colleagues identified three central premises 
(Marks et al. 1996): decision-making competencies are shared by actors at different levels 
(EU, national, sub-national) rather than monopolized by state executives; collective 
decision-making among Member States involves a significant loss of control for individual 
Member States; and political arenas are interconnected rather than nested, meaning that 
sub-national actors can pursue their interests through EU as well as domestic channels. 
 
To empirically assess MLG in the EU, it was deemed necessary to dissect the different 
phases of the policy cycle - policy initiation, decision-making, implementation and 
adjudication – and consider both formal and informal practices. In doing so, the Marks et 
al. (1996) model of MLG placed particular emphasis on the Commission’s agenda-setting 
power, the erosion of state sovereignty in decision-making, the key role of the Commission 
as well as sub-national actors in the implementation of some policies (especially Cohesion 
Policy), and the increasingly activist stance of the European Court of Justice in adjudication.    
 
The sources of the MLG are the twin pressures of European integration and 
regionalisation (Marks 1996). The former was driven, in turn, by a combination of 
political factors (such as the weakened position of European powers in the Cold War, the 
attempt to anchor Germany), economic factors (the internationalization of markets, the 
relative decline of European economic competitiveness and demise of national 
Keynesianism), and socio-cultural factors (intensified demands for peace after two World 
Wars). The drivers of regionalisation are equally diverse: efficiency of policy provision; 
overload; fiscal stress; intensified regional competition; unbalanced regional development; 
nationalism etc. 
 
Since the original formulation of MLG, the literature has mushroomed. Several 
generations of research have been identified throughout the 1990’s and 2000s (Stephenson 
2013), including applications to new EU policies (especially Environmental policy), lively 
scholarly debates about the status of MLG as a theory and the validity of its assumptions, 
and conceptual development and refinement. Comprehensive conceptual and empirical 
assessments of MLG can be found elsewhere (Bache and Flinders 2004; Piattoni 2010; 
Enderlein et al. 2012), as can concise summaries of the vices and virtues of MLG theory 
(Jordan 2001; George 2004). Of particular interest to this investigation are contemporary 
conceptualisations of different MLG types, the issue of MLG performance and empirical 
assessments of MLG in Cohesion Policy. Before we examine these strands of MLG literature, 
it is appropriate to clarify the definitional status of MLG.  
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3.1 MLG definitions and key terms 
The first definition of MLG, put forward by Marks (1993: 401), was:  
 
“a system of continuous negotiation amongst nested governments at several territorial tiers 
– supranational, national, regional, and local – as the result of a broad process of  
institutional creation and decisional reallocation that has pulled some previously centralized 
functions of the state up to the supranational level and some down to the local/regional 
level”.  
 
A problem with this definition is that the emphasis on governments and state functions 
obscures the role of non-state actors, which is the central feature of governance as 
opposed to government.  Equally, the term ‘nested’ does not sit well with the non-
hierarchical and network characteristics of MLG. A more fitting and all-encompassing MLG 
definition has been formulated by Schmitter (2004: 72): 
 
“an arrangement for making binding decisions which engages a multiplicity of politically 
independent but otherwise interdependent actors – private and public – are at different 
levels of territorial aggregation in more-or-less continuous 
negotiation/deliberation/implementation, and that does not assign exclusive policy 
competence or assert a stable hierarchy of political authority to any of these levels”.  
 
The usage of the term has become widespread across EU institutions, not least because of 
its rhetorical appeal and neutrality (Schmitter 2004). Unsurprisingly, the Committee of the 
Regions has been most proactive in engaging in MLG conceptual thinking and debates on 
MLG, particularly through its White Paper on Multi-level Governance and launch of an 
MLG Scoreboard. In its 2009 White Paper, MLG is defined as (Committee of the Regions 
2009: 6): 
 
“coordinated action by the European Union, the Member States and local and regional 
authorities, based on partnership and aimed at drawing up and implementing EU policies”. 
 
This definition has been taken up by the European Commission in its draft Code of 
conduct on the partnership principle for Cohesion Policy 2014-2020 (Commission 
2012: 3): 
 
“Multi-level governance means coordinated action by the European Union, the Member 
States and local and regional authorities, based on partnership and aimed at drawing up 
and implementing EU policies”.  
 
A similar definition was put forward in the Committee of the Region’s more recent follow-up 
opinion to the White Paper ‘Building a European culture of Multilevel Governance’, 
but including references to subsidiarity and proportionality as well as operational and 
institutionalised cooperation (Committee of the Regions 2012: 2):  
“coordinated action by the EU, the Member States and regional and local authorities 
according to the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality and in partnership, taking the 
form of operational and institutionalised cooperation in the drawing-up and implementation 
of the European Union's policies”. 
 
Despite the lack of a commonly agreed definition, MLG is generally understood as the 
participation of a range of different types of actors (public, private and societal) 
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in policy-making and implementation through formal and informal means. It is this 
understanding that informs the conceptualisation of MLG used in this study.  
3.2 Types of Multi-level Governance 
More recent theoretical work on MLG has sought to distinguish different types of MLG. 
Liesbet Hooghe and Gary Marks (2003) distinguished two types of MLG (Table 1:1). In line 
with the traditional federalist state structures, Type I MLG conceives authority as shared 
across a small number of government levels (local, regional, national, international) based 
on stable, general-purpose jurisdictions (covering bundles of different policies) with 
mutually exclusive memberships. In the alternative Type II model, MLG is fluid and 
flexible, based on a larger number of task-specific jurisdictions (such as cross-border 
cooperation, community development, local housing, schooling etc.) with overlapping 
memberships, and a much greater presence of private actors.  
 
Table 1: Two Types of MLG 
Type I Type II 
General-purpose jurisdictions Task-specific jurisdictions 
Non-intersecting memberships Intersecting memberships 
Jurisdictions at a limited number of levels No limit to the number of jurisdictions 
Systemwide architecture Flexible design 
Source: Hooghe and Marks (2003: 236) 
While the two types of MLG are analytically distinct, they are not mutually exclusive. MLG II 
tends to be embedded in MLG I and the co-existence of the two types offers 
complementary benefits by providing different strategies for addressing coordination 
problems: limiting the number of autonomous actors and jurisdictions (MLG I); and limiting 
interactions among actors by splitting competences into distinct tasks (MLG II).  
 
A different analytical framework for the analysis of MLG types has been elaborated by 
Arthur Benz (2012), emphasising instead the different degrees of ‘coupling’ across vertical, 
horizontal and intra-governmental levels of MLG in comparative perspective (Table 2:2). 
Contrasting with the tightly coupled (connected) German model of federalism, which is 
prone to decisional gridlock, MLG in the EU is classified as a loosely coupled arrangement, 
which facilitates decision-making (see also Benz 2000).  
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Table 2: Types of MLG – different levels and coupling 
 Uncoupled Tightly coupled Loosely coupled 
Vertical 
intergovernmental 
Mutual adjustment in 
dual federalism 
Joint  
decision-making 
Negotiation in the 
shadow of hierarchy, 
networks, mutual 
adjustment by 
benchmarking, open 
method of coordination 
Horizontal 
intergovernmental 
Autonomy (no 
coordination between 
jurisdictions), 
institutional 
competition 
Institutional 
homogeneity, 
multilateral negotiation 
Institutional diversity, 
voluntary negotiations 
(opt out, enhanced 
cooperation), limited 
fiscal relations 
Intra-governmental Executive dominance Binding mandates of 
parliaments 
Negotiated mandates 
between parliaments 
and government 
Source: Benz (2012: 224) 
3.3 MLG Effectiveness and Legitimacy 
Functionalist explanations of the rise of MLG emphasise the effectiveness and legitimacy 
benefits of this governance technology. According to Marks and Hooghe (2003), the key 
benefit of MLG is its scale flexibility allowing:  
 
• externalities to be internalised  
• economies of scale to be exploited; and  
• tailoring of policies to reflect the heterogeneous preferences of citizens. 
 
These benefits are based on political economy and fiscal federalist theory insights on public 
goods.  
 
By contrast, comparative federalist and organisational theories would point to the process 
benefits of learning from different territorial jurisdictions on the one hand, and the 
facilitation of collective decision-making through informal cooperative exchanges 
among actors on the other (Benz 2012). 
 
However, effectiveness and legitimacy can also be problematic in MLG due to 
complexity, the blurring of responsibilities and joint-decision traps (Benz 2000). At 
a normative level, MLG may pose a ‘Faustian bargain’ in which ‘core values of democratic 
government are traded for accommodation, consensus and the purported increased 
efficiency in governance’ (Pierre and Peters 2004). The negative consequences for 
democratic accountability have been well-articulated by Yannis Papadapoulos (2010):  
 
• a lack of visibility to outsiders (citizens and the media) and difficulty in identifying 
responsibility when many actors are involved;  
• the disconnection from representative institutions (parliaments);  
• an over-representation of actors that are weakly accountable to citizens 
(technocrats, experts, economic and social actors);  
• the informal character of cooperation reduces transparency and facilitates blame-
avoidance games;  
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• and a prevalence of ‘peer’ accountability at the expense of accountability ‘at home’, 
which may not address the collective good due to the dominance of insiders and 
weak mutual scrutiny. 
 
Moreover, the co-existence of different types of MLG can be problematic for 
accountability in so far as it poses compatibility and coherence tensions. These 
tensions are arguably compounded in the presence of multiple and different Type II MLG 
bodies – such as voluntary clubs, government agencies and polity-forming bodies - with 
different legitimacy, consent and accountability practices (Skelcher 2005).  
 
Table 3: Democratic Alignment of Type I and Type II Entities 
 Type I Type II 
Club Agency Polity-forming 
Features Established through 
constitution 
building or 
legislation by 
higher level of 
government 
Self-generated to 
deliver benefits to 
members 
Created by 
government to 
deliver policies 
through flexible 
management 
under arm’s-
length political 
supervision  
Established to 
engage well-
defined 
constituency of 
users or residents 
in local 
formulation and 
delivery of 
specific public 
policy 
Legitimacy Through electoral 
systems and civic 
support 
On basis of 
benefits accruing 
to members 
On basis of 
central 
government 
mandate 
On basis of 
popular 
participation 
Consent By elected 
representatives 
On basis of self-
interested 
assessment 
Appointed by 
board or 
nominated by 
government 
Through 
deliberative 
processes 
between board 
and constituency 
Accountability To legislative body 
of elected 
representatives and 
to citizens 
To organizational 
stakeholders in 
terms of cost-
benefit ratio 
To government at 
higher level on 
basis of policy 
performance 
To constituency 
on basis 
of democratic 
process and policy 
achievement 
Source: Skelcher (2005: 98) 
A recent tool created by the Committee of the Regions to improve understanding, 
assessment and monitoring of MLG effectiveness and legitimacy is the MLG Scoreboard. 
The scoreboard’s comparative framework distinguishes several MLG criteria relating to (1) 
procedures: (i) information and consultation (ii) stakeholders’ involvement (iii) 
responsiveness; and to (2) content: (i) territorial/integrated approach (ii) smart regulation 
mechanisms; and (iii) innovative instruments for implementation.  
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Table 4: The MLG Performance Scoreboard  
(1) Procedures 
 
(2) Content 
(i) Information & Consultation 
• Information is rapidly available about all 
stages of the decision-making process.  
• Public consultations launched with sufficient 
time and with well-constructed questions  
• Systematic dialogue with European and 
national associations of Local and Regional 
Authorities (LRA)  
• Effective and transparent decentralised  
• communication policy using networks, grass 
roots organisations and LRAs 
(i) Territorial/integrated approach 
• Integrated, place-based approach: policy is 
taking territorial aspects into account and 
considering the development of other 
policies and strategies.  
• Multi-sectorial policy, considering local and 
regional knowledge and expertise.  
• A regular monitoring system is in place for 
evaluating the territorial approach 
(ii) Stakeholders' Involvement 
• Promotion of LRA involvement in 
transparent and open consultations. High 
RLA participation rate  
• The contributions are of good quality and 
consistent priorities are formulated by LRAs.  
(ii) Smart regulation mechanisms 
• Aspects of simplification and reduction of 
administrative burdens are always 
considered.  
• Territorial impact analysis is carried out, in 
which LRAs are duly involved at the early 
stages of the cycle. Ex-post evaluation 
findings relevant for LRAs are considered.  
• Appropriate subsidiarity and proportionality 
checks are conducted  
(iii)  Responsiveness 
• The EU institutions ensure receptiveness, 
openness and a real dialogue with LRA.  
• Contributions from LRAs are taken into 
account at all stages of the policy process. 
(iii) Innovative Instruments for 
Implementation 
• Promotion of the use of innovative 
instruments which improve implementation 
of legislation in partnership  
• Examples: territorial pacts, other innovative 
commitments of LRAs related to EU 
objectives or new approaches for the open 
method of coordination 
Source: Committee of the Regions (2012)  
To date, two editions of the Scoreboard have been produced covering several EU agendas 
and policy domains: Europe 2020 Strategy, Energy Strategy 2020, Stockholm Programme, 
Spring Package 2010 (Scoreboard 1); and the Single Market, European Neighbourhood 
Policy, Structural Funds and Common Agricultural Policy (Scoreboard 2). Overall, marked 
variations were found in MLG performance across EU policies and governance 
practices. In particular, EU practices relating to procedures (i.e. information, consultation, 
stakeholder involvement and responsiveness) better respected the objectives of MLG than 
practices related to the content of the policies and the use of innovative instruments (the 
territorial approach, smart regulation mechanisms, innovative instruments). 
 
The idea for an MLG Scoreboard has its origins in the Committee of the Regions’ earlier 
White Paper on MLG, which included several recommendations to enhance the problem-
solving potential and legitimacy-enhancing effects of MLG (Committee of the Regions 
2009):  
 
• accompany major strategic reforms with a regional action plan agreed between 
the Commission and Committee of the Regions, setting out the political mechanisms 
to facilitate the ownership, implementation, evaluation and communication of the 
policies;  
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• establish tools to support participatory democracy, particularly in the 
framework of the Lisbon Strategy, social agenda, Gothenburg Strategy and 
development of “Local Agenda 21” type mechanisms; 
• reinforce partnership practice, both vertically between “local and regional 
authorities – national government and European Union” and horizontally between 
“local and regional authorities – civil society”, particularly in the context of social 
dialogue;  
• reform the Open Method of Coordination to make it more inclusive, by 
developing participatory governance indicators and territorial indicators, in 
conjunction with regional and local authorities;  
• institutionalise territorial impact analysis through the involvement, upstream of 
the policy decision, of the various actors concerned ; 
• support the use of experimentation at local and regional level in relevant EU 
policies;  
• establish European territorial Pacts to bring together competent tiers of 
government in order to adapt the implementation of major EU priorities and 
objectives. 
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4 MULTI-LEVEL GOVERNANCE IN COHESION POLICY  
4.1 The partnership principle 
The origins of MLG lie in the study of EU Cohesion Policy and especially the implementation 
of the partnership principle (Marks 1992; 1993). The partnership principle was codified as a 
regulatory requirement under the 1988 reform, requiring the involvement of regional and 
local authorities in programme formulation and implementation for the first time. Since 
then, the regulations have consistently emphasised the importance of involving regional 
and local authorities, but have extended the scope of the principle by specifying a role for 
economic and social partners within the framework of national rules and practice (1993 
reform), the need to involve authorities responsible for the environment and for the 
promotion of gender equality (1999 reform) and NGOs and civil society bodies (2006 
reform). This evolution is summarised in Box 1:. In short, the formal regulatory 
requirements on the partnership principle have evolved from Multi-level Government to 
Multi-level Governance.  
Box 1: The Evolution of the Partnership Principle: From Multi-level Government to 
Multi-level Governance 
1988 reform  
Community operations shall be such as to complement or contribute to corresponding 
national operations. They shall be established through close consultation between the 
Commission, the Member State concerned and the competent authorities designated 
by the latter at national, regional, local or other level, with each party acting as a 
partner in pursuit of a common goal. These consultations are hereinafter referred to as the 
‘partnership’. The partnership shall cover the preparation, financing, monitoring and 
assessment of operations 
1993 reform  
Community operations shall be such as to complement or contribute to corresponding 
national operations. They shall be established through close consultations between the 
Commission, the Member State concerned and the competent authorities and bodies - 
including, within the framework of each Member State's national rules and current 
practices, the economic and social partners, designated by the Member State at 
national, regional, local or other level, with all parties acting as partners in pursuit of a 
common goal. These consultations shall hereinafter be referred to as the "partnership ". 
The partnership shall cover the preparation and financing, as well as the ex-ante appraisal, 
monitoring and ex post evaluation of operations. The partnership will be conducted in full 
compliance with the respective institutional, legal and financial powers of each of the 
partners.  
1999 reform  
1. Community actions shall complement or contribute to corresponding national operations. 
They shall be drawn up in close consultation, hereinafter referred to as the ‘partnership’, 
between the Commission and the Member State, together with the authorities and bodies 
designated by the Member State within the framework of its national rules and current 
practices, namely:  
- the regional and local authorities and other competent public authorities, 
- the economic and social partners, 
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- any other relevant competent bodies within this framework. 
The partnership shall be conducted in full compliance with the respective institutional, 
legal and financial powers of each of the partners (...). In designating the most 
representative partnership at national, regional, local or other level, the Member State 
shall create a wide and effective association of all the relevant bodies, according to 
national rules and practice, taking account of the need to promote equality 
between men and women and sustainable development through the integration 
of environmental protection and improvement requirements. All the designated parties, 
hereinafter referred to as the ‘partners’, shall be partners pursuing a common goal.’ 
2. Partnership shall cover the preparation, financing, monitoring and evaluation of 
assistance. Member States shall ensure the association of the relevant partners at the 
different stages of programming, taking account of the time limit for each stage. 
2006 Reform  
1. The objectives of the Funds shall be pursued in the framework of close cooperation, 
(hereinafter referred to as partnership), between the Commission and each Member 
State. Each Member State shall organise, where appropriate and in accordance with 
current national rules and practices, a partnership with authorities and bodies such as: 
(a) the competent regional, local, urban and other public authorities; 
(b) the economic and social partners; 
(c) any other appropriate body representing civil society, environmental 
partners, non-governmental organisations, and bodies responsible for 
promoting equality between men and women. 
Each Member State shall designate the most representative partners at national, 
regional and local level and in the economic, social, environmental or other spheres 
(hereinafter referred to as partners), in accordance with national rules and practices, 
taking account of the need to promote equality between men and women and 
sustainable development through the integration of environmental protection and 
improvement requirements. 
2. The partnership shall be conducted in full compliance with the respective 
institutional, legal and financial powers of each partner category as defined in 
paragraph 1. 
The partnership shall cover the preparation, implementation, monitoring and evaluation 
of operational programmes. Member States shall involve, where appropriate, each of 
the relevant partners, and particularly the regions, in the different stages of 
programming within the time limit set for each stage. 
Source: Council Regulation 2052/88 (Art. 4); Council Regulation 2081/93 (Art. 4); Council Regulation 1260/99 (Art. 
8); Council Regulation 1083/2006 (Art. 11).  
A wide range of academic studies have examined MLG and partnership principle 
implementation in Cohesion Policy across different countries and over time (e.g. Heinelt 
and Smith 1996; Hooghe 1996; Bache 1998, 2008). There is general consensus in the 
literature that Cohesion Policy requirements have supported and strengthened 
multi-level partnership arrangements involving the participation of a broad array of 
public, private and societal actors in programme design and delivery across the EU. 
However, it is also argued that national governments have continued to exert a 
strong grip on key decisions and that there has been resistance to EU pressures for sub-
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national empowerment and inclusive, horizontal partnership-working where this has been 
against domestic preferences or pre-existing traditions.  
4.2 Assessments of MLG across the Cohesion policy cycle  
The first comprehensive study of MLG in Cohesion Policy across several countries was 
the edited volume by Hooghe (1996). The study assessed the relative influence of different 
actors (Commission, national, regional and local) across four stages of the policy 
process: (i) formulating development plans; (ii) negotiating plans with the Commission; 
(iii) designing programmes; and (iv) monitoring and implementation. Significant variation 
in sub-national participation was found across the different programming stages. This was 
explained by the functional characteristics of each stage, particularly the reliance of the 
central government on information from sub-national authorities. Sub-national influence in 
all countries was greatest during programme implementation/monitoring, followed by 
the design of plans/programmes, and least influential in negotiations with the 
Commission.  
 
Moreover, variations in the political influence of different actors were greater 
across countries than within them, implying that a country’s system of territorial 
relations was a more powerful predictor of sub-national influence than the functional stage 
of programming. The influence of the Commission, in turn, was greater in those countries 
receiving greater amounts of Community funding.  
 
Aside from assessing the extent of MLG across the different stages of the Cohesion Policy 
cycle, the study found evidence of knock-on effects on wider territorial relations in some 
countries. In Ireland and Greece, in particular, the central government’s traditional ‘gate-
keeping’ role had been weakened providing a new source of expectations for sub-national 
actors. By contrast, in Belgium and Spain the Structural Funds had interacted with on-
going regionalization pressures adding another dimension to existing territorial conflicts. 
Lastly, in France, Germany and the UK, the highly institutionalised nature of territorial 
relations prevented any significant impact on existing governance arrangements, although 
Structural Funds implementation in France and the UK had led to increased participation by 
sub-national actors in the planning of domestic regional policies.  
 
The first major Commission-sponsored evaluation of the partnership principle extended the 
period of analysis to cover the first (1989-93) and (part of the) second (1994-99) 
programming cycles, based on a larger selection of 54 case studies across all EU Member 
States (Tavistock Institute 2009). The study found significant differences in the 
participation of partners at different stages of the programming cycle. The more important 
role for most partners was in the planning of programmes and project selection. There 
was a variable role for different partners for various operational tasks, and a less 
developed role in terms of review and evaluation.  
 
Among the main positive benefits attributed to partnership were: 
 
• greater effectiveness in programme development and monitoring; 
• more effective project selection; 
• greater legitimacy and transparency in decisions and decision-making processes; 
• greater commitment and ownership of programme outputs; 
• opportunities for reinforcing innovation and learning across organisational 
boundaries; and  
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• development of institutional capacity at sectoral and territorial levels. 
 
The key factors shaping partnership evolution in the Member States were:  
 
• prior experience of partnership-working;  
• an accommodation with national institutional, administrative and cultural traditions; 
• regionalisation, decentralisation or deconcentration of public administration; and 
• the contribution of the Commission as animators and regulators 
 
Finally, the uneven practice of partnership principle implementation across Member States 
and programmes implied that there was significant scope for improvements in: 
 
• inclusiveness of partnership; 
• transparency of partnership functioning; 
• MC functioning; 
• technical support for participating partners and 
• partnership in programme development and evaluation stages. 
 
Some of these findings were echoed in the ex-post evaluation of the management and 
implementation of the ERDF/CF in the 2000-2006 period (EPRC and METIS 2009): 
 
• the extent of partnership differed considerable across the EU25, but MCs provided 
the main forum for partner participation in all countries;  
• partner involvement was dominated by public central and regional actors directly 
involved in funding/delivery of the programmes; 
• the extent of partnership working was influenced by formal administrative 
practices/traditions and the experience/capacity of regional and socio-economic 
partners  
4.3 Challenges to the introduction of MLG in Cohesion Policy 
4.3.1 Lack of tradition 
Following the accession of new Member States in 2004/2006, there has been increasing 
interest in the application of the partnership principle in Central and Eastern Europe. As in 
the older Member States, academic assessments confirmed the varied nature of regional 
involvement (Ferry and McMaster 2005), and questioned the notion that Structural Funds 
build regional structures and competence and necessarily leads to ’stronger regions’ 
(Bachtler and McMaster 2007). Indeed, in EU12 countries, the vast majority of funding is 
allocated to sectoral programmes that are governed in a centralised way (Bruszt 2008).  
Similarly, Dabrowski (2013) finds that a lack of tradition of decentralization and 
collaborative policy-making, as well as a limited capacity of sub-national actors, result in 
uneven outcomes of the application of the partnership principle across Central and Eastern 
European countries and regions. 
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4.3.2 Lack of resources 
A more general criticism that applies across old and new Member States is that the extent 
of involvement and influence of non-public sector bodies in programme decision-making 
processes remains limited (Businesseurope 2007, European Parliament 2008, Churski 2008, 
Ahner 2009, Batory and Cartwright 2011, ECSC 2010). These actors often do not have the 
resources to actively participate or influence programme design and implementation, 
challenges which are compounded by the complexity of Cohesion Policy rules (Polverari and 
Michie 2009; Mendez and Bachtler 2011).  
4.3.3 Shifts in policy priorities and EU-domestic relations 
The sustainability of partnership-working can also be questioned owing to declining 
Cohesion Policy allocations in some Member States and regions as well as the 
associated rationalisation of partnership-based management arrangements (Polverari and 
Michie 2009). Indeed, the ‘Lisbonisation’ of Cohesion Policy in 2007-2013 has encouraged 
centralisation   in some countries due to the greater role of national government in key 
Lisbon-related RTDI policies (Mendez 2011; 2013). Moreover, rising resentment and 
conflict between the European Commission and regional authorities highlight the limitations 
of MLG ‘calling into question whether it is an appropriate and sustainable inter-
administrative co-ordination device’ (Bauer 2002). This has been compounded in the mid-
2000s by the ‘audit explosion’ in Cohesion Policy, which has reduced trust between the 
Commission and national/regional/local actors (Mendez and Bachtler 2011). 
 
Bachtler and Mendez (2007) contribute to the MLG literature through a two-level analysis of 
the roles of the Commission and Member States (excluding sub-national actors, which 
would represent the third level). In the implementation of the programming principle, it 
was found that the role of national governments (relative to the European Commission) had 
been exaggerated in the literature. Contrary to other studies, the 1994-99 period is 
represented as the “high water mark” of Commission influence over programme 
orientations and financial allocations. Moreover, the nature of the Commission’s 
influence has evolved (rather than diminished) over time, from regulatory compliance 
(1989-93) to financial inputs, monitoring, control and audit (1994-2006) and, 
subsequently, to the strategic coordination level (2007-2013).  
 
In line with this top-down perspective on MLG, assessments of programming in the 
2007-2013 period found that the Community Strategic Guidelines and earmarking 
requirements provided a new source of leverage for the Commission to shape the targeting 
of funding across countries and regions (Mendez 2011). Looking forward to the next period, 
the power of the Commission in programming has been reinforced in the post-2013 
period through ring-fencing and ex-ante conditionality requirements (Mendez 2013). In 
terms of sub-national participation, the code of conduct on the partnership principle and 
the greater priority placed on community-led local development provides an opportunity for 
strengthening the regional and local dimensions of MLG in the future (Mendez 2013). These 
provisions are a Commission response to criticisms about the performance of Cohesion 
Policy and the lack of a place-based approach (Barca 2009).  
4.3.4 The rising complexity of bureaucracy  
A frequent criticism of Cohesion Policy is the high administrative costs of the MLG 
model.  However, a Commission-sponsored study found that, other comparable policy fields 
have considerably higher administrative costs than EU Cohesion Policy, such as the World 
Bank’s global and regional partnership programmes and a range of other bilateral aid 
programmes, while The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) has 
broadly comparable management and implementation structures and roughly similar 
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general administrative expenses. Moreover, various types of management and 
implementation systems across the Member States did not differ significantly in terms of 
administrative workload (SECO 2010). Centralised systems have a somewhat lower median 
administrative workload than regionalised and mixed systems. The differences are minor 
though.  
4.3.5 Debating the legitimatisation of Cohesion Policy through MLG 
Finally, another strand of the literature on MLG has a more normative orientation by 
examining the democratic and legitimacy implications of Cohesion Policy implementation. 
Olsson (2003) identified democracy ‘paradoxes’ of MLG in Cohesion Policy, particularly the 
dominance of a top–down and technocratic model which marginalises the role of 
democratic institutions. To ‘democratize’ MLG in Cohesion Policy, partnerships should be 
regulated or challenged with the parliamentary principle through a stronger role for popular 
elected institutions. Similarly, Bache and Chapman (2008) provide evidence of the 
dominant role of elite experts and the relative marginalization of elected local politicians in 
the English regional OP of South Yorkshire. However, they also argue that the Structural 
Funds provide mechanisms that are located closer to citizens and their concerns than do 
municipality-wide elections. 
 
An EU-level assessment of the effectiveness and legitimacy of the Cohesion Policy MLG 
architecture is provided in the Committee of the Regions’ MLG Scoreboard. Drawing on a 
consultation with experts, the Structural Funds are regarded as a best-practice MLG model 
across EU policies with respect to multilevel information and consultation based on open 
and transparent information exchange across institutions and high levels of stakeholder 
access and engagement (EIPA 2012). The remaining scores are lower – for MLG 
responsiveness, territorial-integrated approach, smart regulation and innovative 
instruments – but still high compared to other policies. 
 
Figure 1: MLG score of Structural Funds 
 
Scoring system: 0-1: the principle has been ignored in practice; 2: seriously neglected and major shortcomings in 
practice; 3: Insufficient efforts made to satisfy requirements, and principle not satisfied in practice; 4: The 
principle minimally satisfied, but improvements possible; 5: principle satisfied to a high degree, but gaps exist 
which could be addressed; 6: Every reasonable effort has been made to satisfy the principle, and the practice is as 
good as can realistically be imagined. 
Source: EIPA (2012: 6) 
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5 MULTI-LEVEL GOVERNANCE IN THE COHESION POLICY 
CYCLE – A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE 2007-2013 
PERIOD 
MLG requirements in Cohesion Policy are codified in the partnership principle. As noted, for 
2007-2013 the principle requires the Member States to organise programme partnerships 
between (a) the competent regional, local, urban and other public authorities (b) the 
economic and social partners and (c) any other appropriate body representing civil society, 
environmental partners, NGOs, and bodies responsible for promoting equality between men 
and women. Partnership covers the preparation, implementation, monitoring and 
evaluation of operational programmes.  
 
The highly theoretical concept of MLG in Cohesion Policy cannot be discussed without 
looking at how it is applied in practice. Distinguishing the different stages of the Cohesion 
Policy cycle, the following sections review the experience of MLG in Cohesion Policy in 
2007-2013 based on the 9 case studies selected for this study. 
The policy phases explored are, chronologically: 
 
• Preparation of the OP 
• Project selection 
• Programme management 
• Monitoring  
• Evaluation 
 
For each policy phase, the following characteristics are compared and analysed: 
 
• government levels and the actors involved  
• Distribution of competences 
• Description of the mechanisms used to involve various actors  
• The main advantages of involving these actors 
• The main challenges and disadvantages of involving various actors 
5.1 Preparation of OPs 
5.1.1 Government levels involved in the preparation of the OP 
The formal responsibility for preparing OPs lies with the Member States and MAs of the 
programmes. In all of the cases examined, the preparation process involved close 
cooperation and consultation with government ministries, departments and agencies 
at both national and regional levels in all of the programmes examined. A distinctive 
feature of this period was the requirement to elaborate a National Strategic Reference 
Framework to inform or coordinate the programming of the OPs, necessitating a more 
active coordination role at national level in all Member States than previously.  
 
The most autonomous regional role in OP development could be seen in a federal 
context, namely in North Rhine-Westphalia where the OP was developed independently 
from the federal level reflecting the highly devolved nature of the political system and 
regional development competences. The development of the North East England OP was 
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also organized at the regional level, led by the Regional Development Agency and overseen 
by the region’s Government Office, which represented national government departments 
and coordinated local authorities but have since been abolished.  
 
While the role of regional-level actors was important in the remaining programmes, there 
was generally a stronger coordination role at national level. Among the regional 
programmes, the strongest national role could be seen in Castilla y Leon where the national 
MA was responsible for coordinating the process, particularly the programming of the 
national interventions including in the OP. However, the Castilla y Leon regional 
government develops its own regional interventions independently, which are then 
combined with national interventions to form the single regional OP. Similarly, the main 
programming decisions were taken at the regional level in Languedoc-Roussillon, Silesia 
and Southern Finland within a programming framework that was steered and guided by 
national actors. As one would expect, the programming of the national OP in Slovenia and 
the two ETC OPs was coordinated at national level. However, national actors drew heavily 
on regional inputs. For instance, the lead role for the preparation of the two ETC OPs was 
taken by the regional MA of both OPs in Austria drawing on contributions from regional 
actors in all of the partner states. 
 
Turning to consultation with the broader partnership of OP stakeholders, the general 
picture of OP preparation in 2007-2013 has been one of wide consultation and 
partner involvement. There are examples of extensive, highly inclusive consultation 
processes, incorporating a wide range of partners from an early stage. In particular, there 
seems to have been greater input from non-state actors and environmental and non-
discrimination bodies than in previous periods, in line with the new emphasis on these 
actors in the partnership principle. However, in some cases plan preparation has been 
restricted to key partners with the aim of keeping the consultation process within 
manageable bounds. 
5.1.2 Mechanisms used to involve various actors in the preparation of the OP 
All programmes involved local governments, economic and social partners, environmental 
and gender equality bodies, NGOs and civil society groups in programme preparations. 
However, the extent of the involvement and influence of the stakeholders varied 
as did the mechanisms used to engage them in OP preparations. 
 
• Programme working groups and committees to support OP drafting were formally 
established in a number of cases (ETC OP Alpine Space, ETC OP Austria-Czech 
Republic, OP Castilla y Leon, OP Languedoc-Roussillon, OP North-East England, OP 
Southern Finland), though usually only involving government bodies. For instance, 
an interviewee from the ETC OP Austria-Czech Republic argued that broader 
economic, social and civil society stakeholders lack the knowledge or common vision 
to contribute effectively to these types of meetings. By contrast, in North East 
England the development of the OP was overseen by a steering group made up of 
partners from central government, the Regional Development Agencies (RDA), local 
authorities and social partners. 
• Thematic working groups were created involving a broader participation of 
different actors. In Languedoc-Roussillon, the groups included regional and local 
authorities, institutional and socio-economic partners, the CESR (Conseil 
économique, social et environnemental régional – one of the two regional 
assemblies that exist in each region) and the government departments in specially 
created thematic working groups. In Silesia, Workshops with social partners were 
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organised in 2005 focusing on four thematic groups to develop project typologies, 
selection criteria and beneficiaries. In Southern Finland, informal meetings focused 
on drafting content for individual priorities and were open to non-state partners and 
experts.  
• Targeted meetings for specific actors and/or larger stakeholder events were 
organised. In Castilla y Leon, the meetings targeted economic and social partners, 
while Languedoc-Roussillon, Nord-Rhine Westphalia, the OP for Strengthening the 
Regional Development potential (SRDP) in Slovenia and Southern Finland organised 
larger stakeholder meetings. Similarly, Silesia presented the ROP at stakeholder 
events towards the end of 2005, involving participation from 283 representatives of 
local governments, business organisations, schools and higher education or other 
organisations from the Voivodeship. In Slovenia, the stakeholder meetings were 
followed up by cooperation activities to increase the exchange of ideas between the 
representatives of different NGOs and the MA. 
• Public consultations of draft OPs were organised in all of the cases, sometimes 
involving several rounds of consultation. In Silesia, a public online consultation by 
the Board of Silesia Voivodeship was held between August-September 2005, 
collecting information on regional needs and opinions on the measures and projects 
from 215 institutions. The Board of Slaksie Voivodeship adopted a second draft of 
the OP incorporating the comments from the social consultations. That draft was 
again subject to social consultation (over 150 participants from the different 
sectors). After presenting the new draft OP to the Ministry of Regional Development, 
in May 2006 the ROP social consultations were held via the PARTNER II internet site. 
The same was the case for the third version of the ROP. In other cases, successive 
consultations exercises were heavily focused at the earlier stage, i.e. prior to the 
first draft of the OP (OP North-East England, OP SRDP Slovenia). In North-East 
England, a foresight exercise was led by the RDA with a number of expert panels 
and consultation events and a final programme of dissemination. This drew on the 
views of all public bodies in the region, business representatives, higher education, 
unions, voluntary sector etc. 200 stakeholders were initially interviewed, with more 
participating in dissemination events. The initial OP draft was open to consultation, 
then reshaped into a formal proposal and subject to a formal written consultation 
process, leading to the early drafts of the programmes itself, which was again 
subject to a statutory three month consultation process, a strategic environmental 
assessment, plus an equalities impact assessment. 
5.1.3 Influence of these actors in OP programming 
It is difficult to quantify the relative impact of individual partners through these different 
mechanisms. Few of the interviewees were able to provide concrete examples of influence, 
while OP documents only provided vague statements on their involvement usually ascribing 
a positive influence to all the partners involved. The Slovenian SRDP OP is more unique in 
that it identifies specific amendments in response to consultations in an annex although it 
does not identify the specific actors responsible for most of the changes: 
 
• a list of key projects (indicative financial plan), including the suggestions of the 
representatives of subregions; 
• the instrument (Integrated Subregional Development Programmes) of the co-
participation of territorial self-government units in the decision-making process 
• selection of projects to be co-financed; 
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• the allocation for Priority III: Tourism was substantially increased; 
• the opportunities of obtaining financial resources by rural municipalities were 
increased by organizing separate tenders; 
• the list of beneficiaries was expanded; 
• the subject scope of the Programme was modified. 
 
Nevertheless, the documentary analysis and interviews across the different OPs suggests 
the following general ranking of participation and influence by the key actors in 
programming:  
 
• High: Government bodies at national and/or regional level.  
• Medium: environmental and gender equality bodies, local government, economic 
and social partners. 
• Low: NGOs and civil society organisations.  
 
These findings are broadly in line with previous studies reviewed in Chapter 1. Some 
illustrative examples from the case studies examined are summarised in Box 2:. 
Box 2: Key OP authorities are most influential in OP preparation: Examples from 
the case studies 
OP Castilla y Leon: The interview with the regional managing body considered the most 
influential actors to be central and regional government bodies with ERDF coordination and 
implementation responsibilities, followed by the public bodies/agencies responsible for 
gender equality and the environment. The influence of economic and social partners - 
notably the economic and social council CES (Consejo Económico y Social), the 
Confederation of Business Organizations of Castilla y Leon CECALE (Confederación de 
Organizaciones Empresariales de Castilla y León) and the Labour Union UGT (Sindicato 
Unión General de Trabajadores) - was less important but still perceived to be relevant. 
Finally, the participation and influence of NGOs to programming was limited, although the 
public consultation did provide an opportunity for participation. 
OP Languedoc-Roussillon: According to the MA, the order of influence in the 
programming phase was, due to the political and administrative system in France, the 
Government (national level) followed by the Départements, while civil society was least 
influential.  
OP SRDP, Slovenia: The MA considers that a high effort was made to foster close 
cooperation with the competent regional, local and other public bodies, economic and social 
partners as well as other authorities which represent the civil society, environmental 
partners, NGOs and bodies responsible for the promotion of gender equality. By contrast, 
an NGO represented on the MC was not satisfied with their involvement as their inputs 
were not fully taken into consideration in the final documents. In the interviewee’s opinion, 
the comments of non-decision-makers are not likely to be taken seriously in conditions of 
poor communication culture and time constraints.  
OP Southern Finland: According to the interviews, the Ministry of Interior (in this case 
the MA) was the most influential, followed closely by Regional Councils (which represent 
the municipalities) and the Regional Centres for Employment and the Economy. There was 
open and regular consultation with economic and social partners and bodies representing 
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civil society, although there were capacity constraints for smaller organisations to be 
involved.  
Source: case studies (interviews and questionnaires) 
5.1.4 The advantages of MLG in the preparation of the OP 
Turning to the benefits of MLG in the OP preparation, a commonly identified advantage in 
most of the cases was the facilitation of buy-in, consensus and collective ownership. 
Box 3: includes illustrative examples from the case studies. 
Box 3: Increase of buy-in, consensus and collective ownership: Examples from the 
case studies  
OP ETC Austria-Czech Republic: According to the Czech National Authority, “the 
programming was accompanied by internal feedback loops at regional and national level on 
both sides of the border in order to ensure broad regional and sector acceptance as well as 
participation of social partners and NGOs”. The cooperation with partners was considered to 
be positive and result-oriented.    
OP North East England: The long process of preparation and consultation was perceived 
to have facilitated ownership. As expressed by the MA: “So, you could argue that people 
had been consulted to death within about 2 to 3 years because they had already had a two 
to three year process on the regional economic strategy and then had to go through 
another one (….) which got us to the end in a really strong position in terms of ownership 
for where exactly we wanted the ERDF operational programme to be.”  
OP Silesia: The main added value of participating in the programming of the OP is, 
according to an interviewed MC member, the access to information, the possibility to 
exchange ideas and “the opportunity to influence the shape of the programming documents 
and the way the documents will be implemented”. Despite the time-constraints related to 
the large quantity of information material sent by the MA, the MC member interviewed was 
very satisfied with the way his department had been involved in the programming phase as 
the final documents had been highly influenced by its opinions. 
OP SRDP, Slovenia: The MA concludes that the involvement of different shareholders 
leads to better understanding, even if the input of the stakeholders is in their own interest. 
In other words, partnership enhances shared ownership despite the fact that some partners 
take programming as an opportunity for promoting their interests. In the end, the MA 
found any input worth consideration. 
Source: case studies (interviews and questionnaires) 
A second beneficial effect of MLG on programming was to bring in additional expertise 
and contribute to improving the quality of the OP. Box 4: includes illustrative examples 
from the case studies. 
Box 4: Bringing in additional expertise: Examples from the case studies 
OP ETC Alpine Space: In the opinion of the MC Member the participation of national 
authorities in the programming phase ensures that responsibilities are assumed as needed 
and coordination with national policy for territorial development is in place. The MC 
member however finds that an important barrier to the involvement and influence of 
various partners in the OP development is the multi-country character of the programme 
with its high number of relevant partners. 
OP ETC Austria-Czech Republic: The consulted MC member appreciated the possibility to 
bring in his experiences especially on formal issues.  
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OP Castilla y Leon: The experience of partnership over successive periods provided a solid 
basis for effective implementation according to the ex-ante evaluators, while improving the 
quality of the programme was cited as an important benefit of partnership by the regional 
managing body. 
OP North Rhine-Westphalia: The feedback and comments received from the partners 
have been highly valued and helped to address aspects that could otherwise easily be 
overlooked by the MA (e.g. in the area of rural development). 
OP Southern Finland: The involvement of a large group of actors in the programming was 
deemed to enable the drafting of the OP, which addresses well the development challenges 
of the region. The wide group of regional actors involved was perceived to improve the 
quality of the OP through their regional expertise.  
OP SRDP, Slovenia: The MA considers that the involvement of partners improved the 
quality of the OP in three main areas: in defining and implementing the environmental 
principle; giving a stronger voice to involving NGOs than in the previous period; and 
drawing attention to the necessity of concentrating on development assets and promoting 
the preparation of quality projects. 
Source: case studies (interviews and questionnaires) 
Factors facilitating the exploitation of these MLG benefits included: 
 
• A pre-existing supportive culture of consultation and cooperation: For 
instance, in Southern Finland, the ability to co-operate and form a joint view among 
partners was partly driven by the established role of cooperation in the Finnish 
regional development administration. 
• A clear division of competences in OP management. In North Rhine-
Westphalia, a clear division of tasks is considered very important to the 
institutionalisation of MLG, which is very well established in Germany.  
• Adequate planning. Staff from the Slovenia OP MA argued that the administrative 
effort associated with MLG is manageable if consultations are planned well in 
advance and carried out in parallel to the programming process. As noted, in North-
East England, consultations on the regions development strategy were organised 2 
years prior to the programming followed by consultations on the ERDF OP drafts. 
5.1.5 Challenges and disadvantages of MLG in the preparation of the OP 
Several drawbacks were also noted in achieving the goals of MLG. The varied and vested 
nature of partner interests was considered to be the most problematic issue. Box 5: 
includes illustrative examples from the case studies. 
Box 5: Varied and vested nature of partners’ interests: Examples from the case 
studies 
OP ETC Alpine Space: While the MA is satisfied with the contribution of different actors to 
the 2007-2013 OP and does not see any need for improvements, the representative argued 
that the main disadvantages of involving many partners in the programming phase is the 
“growing complexity, unrealistic expectations and suggestions linked to insufficient 
knowhow as well as wishful thinking that is not realisable” (Interview MA). 
OP ETC Austria-Czech Republic: The barriers to the effectiveness of the MLG process 
cited by the MC member were due to the size of the programme and the heterogeneity of 
the programme area’s development challenges.  
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OP Languedoc-Roussillon: According to the MA, challenges in accommodating the input 
of social and economic partners were due to the long list of “wishes and comments” based 
on their own interests. A representative of the Conseil Général des Pyrénées-Orientales 
considered that political affiliations and agendas played an important role in the orientation 
of the OP. 
OP North East England: Whilst there was a strong process of consultation, there was 
nonetheless a view among some in the local authority sector that their role had been 
limited and that the strategy that emerged was driven by the interests of the RDA. The 
resultant strategy tended to focus on the needs and interests of the main Tyne and Wear 
conurbation, which was diverging from Tees Valley and the more rural areas. 
OP North Rhine-Westphalia: In the opinion of the Secretariat the main disadvantage of 
involving numerous different partners is the additional workload that comes with it. 
Interests that are brought in must be filtered by the MA. An example is the Ruhr region 
which wants to position itself in the programme but must be hampered by the MA 
repeatedly. The MC member interviewed claimed that the views of his institution were only 
taken into account in the final documents upon intense lobbying activities. His satisfaction 
with the institution’s involvement is moderate. 
OP SRDP, Slovenia: The MA stated that it is difficult to take on board all opinions and 
suggestions coming from different types of actors in the OP. Rather, it is important that 
once the main goals are determined that that the programmes/projects follow these goals 
strictly.  
OP Southern Finland: It was viewed that the organisations commonly view programming 
only as an opportunity to promote their own interests and lack understanding of the ‘big 
picture’. Furthermore, accommodation of the interests of all these social and economic 
partners and regional development actors make it more difficult to draft a well-focused OP.  
Source: case studies (interviews and questionnaires) 
Insufficient strategic dialogue was highlighted as a problem in some cases by non-MA 
partners. A common criticism by most of the regional environmental authorities in Spain is 
that there is insufficient opportunity for strategic reflection and dialogue to inform and add 
value to policy choices. This is partly due to the nature of the Structural Funds regulatory 
framework, especially the requirement to earmark funds to pre-defined expenditure 
categories; and, from an environmental perspective, to the Strategic Environmental 
Assessment (SEA) Directive, which places more emphasis on the minimisation of negative 
environmental impacts rather than maximising positive ones. More strategic dialogue with 
the wider partnership (outside of the MA and implementing bodies) prior to the formulation 
of the draft OP would also be welcomed. In a similar vein, a representative of the 
Languedoc-Roussillon MC committee argued that the regional priorities and the thematic 
concentration of the OP were not totally aligned with the local needs and challenges. 
Finally, an MC member in North Rhine-Westphalia was not entirely satisfied with the 
approach to partnership. In particular, the formal involvement of the sub-regional level 
(e.g. regional development agencies) at an early stage of designing the OP was considered 
inadequate. 
 
Finally, there were administrative capacity and coordination constraints. Box 6: 
includes illustrative examples from the case studies. 
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Box 6: Administrative capacity and coordination constraints: Examples from the 
case studies 
OP Languedoc-Roussillon: Interviewees at national level highlighted three key factors 
limiting MLG: a lack of human resources, capacity and knowledge about EU funds; lack of 
financial resources in the crisis and the undermining of the role of Structural Funds and 
more precisely of evaluation, monitoring and other Technical Assistance activities; and lack 
of political support for EU funds and the resulting difficulty to coordinate between the 
French regional development agency DATAR and the Ministries since there is not one single 
Ministry responsible for EU Funds (the EU Funds are linked to the Ministries based on their 
thematic concentration). Finally, the public consultation on the draft OP received very few 
comments. 
OP Castilla y Leon: the main perceived challenge is the administrative effort required to 
coordinate the various inputs of partners, although the process was considered to have 
worked well in general terms.   
OP Southern Finland: The main concern was the low capacity of some small regional 
actors and some social and economic partners/interest organisations to participate in the 
programming.  
Source: case studies (interviews and questionnaires) 
5.2 Project selection  
5.2.1 Influence of partners in national and regional OPs on project selection 
Project selection is a Member State’s responsibility and is not formally regulated by the 
partnership principle. However, there is a requirement for the OP project selection criteria 
to be approved by the MC, which includes representation from the key partners. Despite 
this formal requirement, OP partnership members - especially non-state actors – often 
have limited influence on the project selection criteria and are not collectively 
involved in the selection of projects in most of the cases. 
 
Box 7: summarizes a few examples from the case studies showing that OP partnership 
members other than the key OP authorities have little influence on project selection.  
Box 7: Limited influence of partners in project selection: Examples from the case 
studies 
OP Castilla y Leon: The MC has responsibility for approving and modifying the OP’s 
project selection criteria formally, but in practice the main decision-making responsibility 
lies with the individual managers of OP interventions who have their own project selection 
criteria and select projects autonomously on the basis of certain conditions: alignment with 
the relevant Priority Axis and expenditure category; conformance with the selection criteria 
approved in the MC; and compatibility with national eligibility rules. The members of the 
MC are informed about the project selection criteria – namely, how they have been selected 
and modified – during the MC meetings and have the opportunity to make observations. 
According to the regional environment authority, additional criteria may sometimes be 
taken on board in response to these observations, but normally as second order criteria.  
OP Languedoc-Roussillon: The Préfet, the Conseil de la Région and the Départements 
(local authorities) co-finance the interventions and are the main decision-makers. Although 
the social and economic partners participate in the MC meetings and the thematic pre-
committee meetings, they are not involved in the decisions about project selection.  
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OP North Rhine-Westphalia: Funding decisions about projects are made by respective 
technical departments of the Federal Ministry of Economy, Energy, Industry, Mittelstand 
and Crafts of North Rhine-Westphalia, other ministries or funding institutions as 
Intermediate Bodies in coordination with the MA, taking the overall responsibility. Within 
the MC, the project selection criteria are defined but no decisions about single projects are 
made. According to the Federal Ministry of Economics and Technology, the discussion about 
project selection is more about transparent procedures and prioritisation and less about the 
selection of single projects. The involvement of different partners is perceived to contribute 
to more effective project selection in this way, although the MC member does not consider 
that there is scope to influence these decisions and would welcome a greater role for the 
OP partnership to contribute.  
OP Silesia: The MA is responsible for all aspects of project decision-making, although the 
MC has the right to comment and change the project selection criteria or the schedule of 
tenders. According to a representative of the Ministry of Regional Development in Warsaw, 
who is part of the MC, the involvement of a variety of partners in the project selection 
process “helps improving the criteria and the adaptation to real needs of potential 
beneficiaries” (Interview Coordinating Unit at National Authority). 
Source: case studies (interviews and questionnaires) 
By contrast, in two of the cases (OP North East England and OP Southern Finland) there is 
a more significant role for partners to contribute to project decisions through regional 
committee structures. These exceptional cases are described in Box 8:.  
Box 8: Involvement of partners in project selection: The examples of North-East 
England and Southern Finland 
OP North-East England: The MC agreed on the terms of reference and the selection 
criteria, but then the actual appraisal and selection decisions were, initially, made within 
the RDA against the selection criteria agreed by the MC. Due to a separation of functions, 
the part of the RDA secretariat doing the MA function was separate within the RDA and 
reported to a Programme Executive Group (PEG), a technical group set up beneath the MC. 
This changed after the abolition of the RDA and strengthened the role of partners in project 
decision-making. After 2010 the statutory instrument, which established the delegation of 
MA functions to the RDA, was rescinded and the staff transferred to the Department of 
Communities and Local Government (DCLG) as the MA. Thus, the selection decisions were 
made within the PEG. However, the overarching strategic dimension still exists and the 
secretariat still had the role of doing the appraisal but their recommendation for 
endorsement or selection is now made within the PEG itself. The MC meets three times per 
year. The PEG, however, has been meeting every four to five weeks, depending upon the 
level of business - even with virtual procedures in place, if needed. The PEG now consists of 
11 members with senior representation from: Deputy Chair of Local Management 
Committee (Chair) (1); Local Enterprise Partnerships (2); Local Authorities (4); Higher 
Education Sector (1); Voluntary and Community sector (1); Private Sector (2). 
OP Southern Finland: The project selection criteria were fine-tuned and approved by the 
MC, but regional Management Committees (and their secretaries) propose and specify the 
criteria and play a key role in defining the development strategies which the structural 
funds programmes implement. Third, the project applications of large and regionally 
significant projects are discussed and approved by Regional Management Committees (or 
by their secretary) in addition to Regional Councils. Although, the project selection process 
may require more time, due to the involvement of Regional Management Committee, it is 
seen to ensure selection of projects that meet the development needs. Furthermore, it 
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improves the policy ownership and ensures that partners prioritise the funded projects 
together.  
Source: case studies (interviews and questionnaires) 
5.2.2 Influence of partners in ETC OPs on project selection 
While the MC Committees in ETC OPs also have the power to approve or reject projects, 
the role of non-state actors in these committees seems to be limited. The ETC case studies 
illustrate this finding in Box 9:.   
Box 9: Influence of non-state actors in ETC MC Committees 
OP ETC Austria-Czech Republic: The MC selects projects on the basis of consensus 
(rather than a majority vote) of the Czech and the Austrian partners, but is not involved in 
the development of prospective calls for tenders which is the responsibility of a task force. 
In the view of the MC member, the involvement of different partners contributes to a more 
effective project selection because different views at regional level are considered as 
valuable for decision making.  
OP ETC Alpine Space: Project proposals are selected by the Programme Committee on 
the basis of a technical assessment and recommendations made by the Joint Technical 
Secretariat (JTS) and the Alpine Space Contact Points (ACPs) in each member country. 
Projects are selected in a two-step application procedure and the MA informs project 
applicants about the results of the selection process. Between the two steps, the JTS and 
ACPs give technical support to the applicants. In order to support the project selection 
process, national representatives are invited to bring in the opinion and outcome of 
discussions in national coordination committees. This interactive process is considered to 
have a positive impact on the effective project selection by the MA interviewee. However, in 
the opinion of the MC member, some stakeholders tend to defend their own project which 
leads to a conflict of interest affecting the partnership process.  
Source: case studies (interviews and questionnaires) 
5.2.3 Cooperation amongst various partners at project level 
Partnership-working can also occur at the level of individual projects, which may involve 
multiple partners in the application and implementation of collaborative projects of a public-
public, private-private or public-private nature. Illustrative project examples from the cases 
are provided in Box 10: based on interviews with project promoters and documentary 
analysis, including differing views on the effectiveness and efficiency of partnership-working 
with different project partners and OP administrators. 
Box 10: Mixed experiences in cooperating with OP authorities and project 
partners: Examples from the case studies 
OP ETC Alpine Space: With regards to the project preparation, the interviewed 
representative of the project “Climate Change Adaptation by Spatial Planning in the Alpine Space 
(CLISP)” criticised the hierarchic system in the OP arguing that the MA had not been able to 
give clear guidance on the eligibility of one partner institution until a few days before 
submission. In the project selection phase all project partners were involved. According to 
the project Lead Partner 1, a non-involvement of some partners in the preparation phase is 
neither desirable nor, in fact, feasible. The main workload is taken up by the lead partner, 
but in particular also all Work Package Leaders were required to take an active role and to 
share responsibilities. 
OP Castilla y Leon: All OP projects are led and managed by single project promoters. 
Nevertheless, the OP’s flagship ‘Palencia Urban Project 2007-2013’ is a participative project 
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involving a range of organisations and civil society groups in the regeneration of two 
neighbourhood districts (“El Cristo” and “el Barrio del Ave María”) through a range of 
actions (the renovation of buildings, the abolition of architectural barriers, the 
establishment of cycle lanes, an indoor sports hall, solar energy street lighting etc). The 
project application was informed by a consultation with over 20 public, private and NGOs 
which committed to participate and cooperate in the project during implementation. A key 
forum for this is the Municipal Environment Council which includes representation from all 
of the key stakeholders and meets on a quarterly basis to monitor and review project 
implementation. 
OP Silesia: The project “e-Myszkovia. Rozwój elektronicznych usług publicznychw Powiecie 
Myszkowskim” led by the district Myszkow (Starostwo Powiatowe w Myszkowie) between 
2007 and 2010, with a total budget of PLN 3,085,624 (approximately €735,951) aims to 
strengthen the implementation of e-administration in its district to increase the efficiency of 
the local administration. In the project application and selection process phase the project 
manager solely cooperated with the Marshall Office of the Silesia Voivodeship. The project 
leader qualified this cooperation as highly effective as well as efficient (not time and 
resource consuming, but with some administrative burden). 
OP SRDP, Slovenia: The project selection phase was considered as very inefficient 
concerning financial and time-related costs within the project partnership (Interview project 
Lead Partner). Regarding the effectiveness and efficiency of cooperating with the OP 
authorities, the rating is similarly bad. According to the project Lead Partner, the project 
application has been very time- as well as resource-consuming in the preparation phase 
because of the intensive planning and presentation requirements. 
OP Southern Finland: The OP’s Priority 5 finances thematic umbrella projects crossing 
regional borders which are selected jointly by the regional Management Committees of 
Southern Finland. The project partners assess this networking and two stepped application 
process as good in terms of increasing the number of projects and their effectiveness. The 
improved co-operation between regions has increased also future prospects for generating 
new projects. 
Source: case studies (interviews and questionnaires) 
5.3 Programme management 
5.3.1 Key actors and government levels involved in OP management 
The key programme management bodies are the MA, Certification Authority and Audit 
Authority. MAs are formally responsible for the key programme management tasks 
including complying with EU rules, financial management and control, interacting with the 
Certification Authority, guiding the MC, commissioning evaluation etc.  
 
The MAs are integrated into government Ministries or agencies at national or 
regional level (Table 5:5). MAs at national level are normally responsible for national OPs 
or multi-regional OPs, such as in Slovenia’s SRDP OP and the Southern Finland ROP. 
However, the MA for the Castilla y Leon and Southern Finland regional OPs are also located 
at the national level, although in practice the functions are shared with the regional 
government or administration. Both of the ETC OPs have regional MAs – as well as Joint 
Technical Secretariats that are specific to ETC OPs - as do the Regional Operational 
Programmes (ROPs for Languedoc-Roussillon, North Rhine-Westphalia, Silesia and North 
East England. The North East England MA was initially located at regional level during the 
start of the programming phase, but has since moved to the national level following the 
abolition of the RDAs in England during 2010.  
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The Certification and Audit Authorities are responsible for certifying/paying funds to 
beneficiaries and auditing systems and expenditure respectively. The Certifying 
Authorities and Audit Authorities are usually located at the same level as the MAs. 
The exceptions are the OP Languedoc-Roussillon and the OP Alpine Space, both of which 
have Audit Authorities at national level. 
 
Table 5: Territorial location of the key management bodies  
OP Title/area Type of OP Managing  
Authority  
Certification 
Authority 
Audit 
Authority 
Austria-Czech Republic 
(specific regions along 
common border) 
ETC Regional National National 
Alpine Space (Germany, 
France, Italy, Austria and 
Slovenia) 
ETC Regional Regional National 
Castilla y Leon  Regional National National National 
Languedoc-Roussillon  Regional Regional Regional National 
North East England Regional National National National 
Strengthening Regional 
Development Potentials - 
SRDP (Slovenia) 
National National National National 
North Rhine-Westphalia Regional Regional Regional Regional 
Silesia Regional Regional Regional Regional 
Southern Finland  Regional National National National 
Source: case studies (interviews and questionnaires) 
There are variations in management structures; the number of actors involved and the 
delegation of tasks to intermediate bodies across the programmes, reflecting the flexibility 
allowed in the Structural Funds Regulations; the nature of programmes and domestic 
institutional arrangements. Box 11: includes examples of each type of OP (1 ETC OP, 2 
regional OPs and 1 national) examined in the case studies in order to illustrate the diversity 
of management structures. 
Box 11: Varying management structures: Examples from the case studies 
OP SRDP Slovenia: The main management bodies are located at national level: the MA is 
represented by the Government Office for Local Self-Government and Regional Policy. The 
Certifying Authority is represented by the Ministry of Finance, National Fund. The Audit 
Authority is represented by the Ministry of Finance.  Intermediate Bodies carry out tasks by 
the MA. The Certifying Authority has to cooperate with the MA on a daily basis with regards 
to controlling and reporting on the financial progress of the OP and the projects. Given that 
the MA has delegated the task of submitting claims for the reimbursement to Intermediate 
Bodies, the Certifying Authority also cooperates with the latter.  
ETC OP Alpine Space: The Austrian MA and Certifying Authority responsibilities have been 
assigned to bodies within the Government Office of the region Salzburg. The Audit 
Authority is represented by the Federal Chancellery of Austria, assisted by a group of 
auditors from each Member State. A JTS was set up to provide expertise and assistance to 
the MA, the MC and, where appropriate, the Audit Authority (Land Salzburg 2007). Each 
partner state set up an ACP “securing a link between the transnational and 
national/regional level in programme implementation and serving as a contact point for 
project applicants and partners in the respective country” (Land Salzburg 2007). 
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Furthermore, the partner states are represented by one national coordinator in the MC who 
safeguards a continuous coordination among partner states. 
OP Languedoc-Roussillon: The MA’s functions are assumed by the Préfet which 
cooperates with the General Secretary for Regional Affairs at the Regional Council. The 
function of Certifying Authority is also carried out by the Préfet. The tasks are delegated to 
the Accountant General of the region (Trésorier Payeur Général de la région Languedoc-
Roussillon). The Audit Authority is the “Commission Interministérielle de Coordination des 
Contrôles portant sur les opérations cofinancées par les fonds structurels européens - 
CICC”. The role of the MA in 2007-2013 is shared between the Préfet (i.e. the national 
level), the Region, and an Intermediate Body (IB): The Conseil de la Region held 28% of 
the MA competence; 30% were held by the IB, which was an agency of the government 
and was responsible for financing; the rest of the MA competence lies within the Préfet, i.e. 
the government, which is coordinated by the DATAR. More precisely, the Préfet and the 
Conseil de Région divide their tasks by sectoral competences (e.g. the Region is responsible 
for regional competencies such as economic development, energy, maritime ports, etc.).  
OP Castilla y Leon: The MA for the Castilla Leon ERDF ROP is the central government’s 
DG for EU Funds (Ministry of Economy and Finance), although this responsibility is shared 
with the EU Funds secretariat of the regional government of Castilla y Leon which is 
designated as an IB for the OP. The EU Funds secretariat and the central MA are both 
responsible for the MA functions and tasks with respect to interventions within their own 
territorial remit and competences. The MA has designated a further 18 intermediate bodies 
at national level to carry out MA tasks (Ministerial departments or agencies responsible for 
Research, Technology, Development and Innovation - RTDI - and business support and 
three local authorities for the local development priority). At the level of the regional 
government, there are nine implementing bodies within the different departments of the 
regional government. The Certification Authority and Audit Authority are also located at the 
national level.  
Source: case studies (interviews and questionnaires) 
5.3.2 Main benefits of shared and delegated management  
Regarding the assessment of MLG in OP management, there were mixed views on the 
benefits of shared or delegated management. Among the main MLG benefits identified were 
the contributions to effective management, to policy coordination, and to 
improving commitment and ownership.  These findings are illustrated with examples 
from the case studies in Box 12:. 
Box 12: The benefits of sharing and delegating management tasks: Examples from 
the case studies 
OP Silesia: a team of desk officers at the Department of Coordination of the Regional 
Programmes, seated at the Ministry of Regional Development Ministry, is responsible for 
coordinating the ROPs, and another team is responsible for monitoring the ROPs and taking 
charge of the financial flows from the EC to the ROPs’ MAs. While the Ministry takes part in 
every MC meeting and answers the questions of the MAs as well as of the beneficiaries, the 
MAs however still have a high level of independence in implementation. The MA as well as 
the MC member report general satisfaction with these arrangements.  
OP North Rhine-Westphalia: The 2012 Annual Implementation Report (AIR) states that 
the coordination between the departments responsible for different EU Funds strengthens 
the complementarity and coherence between the respective objectives of the programmes. 
Further, institutionalised arrangements and meetings between the different MAs of different 
regional OPs and joint participation in the MCs at national level ensure the consistency of 
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the implementation process of each OP. Finally, the high number of intermediate bodies 
allows direct contact with many potential project partners, although it also increase 
complexity and may lead to compliance challenges.  
OP SRDP, Slovenia: The MA considers the involvement of IBs in the OP management to 
improve the effectiveness of OP implementation as these bodies bring in the necessary 
expertise for developing new instruments and supporting the selection process.  
OP Southern Finland: the delegation of MA tasks closer to regional level is perceived to 
be advantageous. First, empowerment of regions improves their commitment and the 
shared ownership of the programme. Second, regional coordination facilitates closer 
cooperation with the intermediary bodies. This enables the regional coordination to advise 
intermediaries on project selection and to monitor their financial progress closely. Third, 
the better knowledge of the region helps the coordination “to see behind the numbers” i.e. 
to know the issues behind the financial progress of the programme, which is useful when 
writing the Annual Implementation Reports.  
Source: case studies (interviews and questionnaires) 
5.3.3 Main challenges related to MLG in programme management 
Negative features of MLG were also identified in terms of diffusing or separating 
management responsibilities and coordination challenges. These challenges are 
mainly linked to increased administrative burden, a lack of clear guidance and shifts of 
responsibility. Box 13: illustrates these findings with examples from the case studies. 
Box 13: Difficulties resulting from separating management responsibilities: 
Examples from the case studies 
OP ETC Austria-Czech Republic: The MA notes that some OP preparation tasks were 
carried out by the JTS but in general the MA backs the opinion that tasks, and especially 
the responsibility, cannot be shared as the signing institution is liable. Moreover, the 
representative of the MA does not find ‘sharing the responsibility of OP management with 
the JTS’ particularly effective: “It is rather an administrative burden as the JTS is located 
far away from the MA. It would be much more effective and efficient if the JTS was 
incorporated in the MA in the form of a new organisational structure. In my opinion the 
regulation is not consistent since the MA already fulfils the whole competence by itself.” 
(Interview MA) 
OP Languedoc-Roussillon: Sharing the competences between the national and regional 
level is a complex process according to the MA. Although the role of DATAR was clearly 
specified, there were often coordination problems between the Ministries due to blurred 
political competences which resulted in “responsibility shifting”. One possible solution could 
consist in designating a single Ministry responsible for all EU funds. According to a 
representative of the Conseil Général des Pyrénées-Orientales, another difficulty lies in the 
differences of interpretation of the documents and tasks. A possible solution would be for 
the MA to delegate certain tasks to MC members and to intensify the exchanges.  
OP SRDP, Slovenia: the MA and CA have recently been separated into different Ministries, 
which results in coordination challenges.  
Source: case studies (interviews and questionnaires) 
5.3.4 Mechanisms needed for ensuring the effectiveness of MLG  
Actions that are considered to contribute to effective MLG in OP management are regular 
information exchange and targeted training measures.  
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• Information exchange: In the ETC OP Alpine Space, the representative of the 
CIPRA (International Commission for the Protection of the Alps) finds the regular 
involvement, consultation, and information of NGOs essential. The Alpine Space 
programme and the CIPRA International institutions share common information 
channels for the dissemination of newsletters and public relations in general. 
Additionally the ACPs of the Alpine Space programme and their own delegations 
regularly exchange information.  The MC member mentioned that the role of 
national contact points most importantly consists in ensuring that the partner-
countries actively contribute in the programme. They cooperate with the MA on 
specific tasks such as disseminating information to potential beneficiaries. In 
addition they contribute to the eligibility check of partners and provide opinions on 
the coherence of the projects with national and regional strategies.  
• Training: A measure that supports the diffusion of knowledge about OP objectives 
and requirements among the managers of OP intervention in Castilla y Leon at the 
regional level is the annual programme of training. The training lasts a week and is 
given by experts from the regional government and central government covering 
administrative tasks (such as financial monitoring and control, compliance with EU 
rules on State aid, environment and gender equality, information and publicity etc.) 
as well as information sessions on the future of Cohesion Policy programming. 
5.3.5 Partnership in management at the level of projects  
Turning to the project level, experiences of partnership working in project management 
were reviewed in several programmes. In general, the interviews with project Lead 
Partners showed that the involvement of different partners in the management of 
projects worked well, both in terms of cooperation with the project partners and OP 
authorities.  
Box 14: includes examples of summary statements of project lead partners who were 
highly satisfied with cooperation between project partners as well as with the OP 
authorities.  
Box 14: Effective cooperation between partners and OP authorities in projects 
OP ETC Alpine Space: Interestingly, the opinions of both projects examined in the Alpine 
Space OP were similar. In the project “CLISP – Climate Change Adaptation by Spatial 
Planning in the Alpine Space” dealing with spatial development within regions vulnerable to 
climate change, the cooperation with OP authorities was considered to be “good and 
helpful” by the project leader. The main challenges were not related to the partnerships per 
se but rather to the administrative issues related to the sudden changes in the 
interpretations of the OP rules and new monitoring and reporting instruments. 
Furthermore, many partner institutions outsourced financial management tasks to 
subcontractors, which considerably increased the number of persons and institutions 
involved and caused communication and steering challenges.  
The same was true for the project “ACCESS – Improving accessibility of services of general 
interest – organisational innovations in rural mountain areas” aimed at improving the 
accessibility to Services of General Interest (SGI) in sparsely populated, mountainous areas 
by finding new forms of organisation of SGI using Information and Communication 
Technologies (ICT) and fostering demand oriented, integrated mobility systems. The Lead 
Partner delegated the tasks related to financial management to the partner from the 
Lombardy region. The project lead partner considered the project partnership to be very 
efficient in all phases of the policy cycle. Similarly, the cooperation with the OP authorities 
was considered to be effective and efficient. No cooperation problems were encountered 
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thanks to regular project steering meetings with high transparency, clear communication 
structures and good relations with early and frank information to the JTS and ACPs.  
OP Languedoc-Roussillon: The ALOGEA project is a housing energy saving project. In 
the implementation phase, the lead Partner worked together with five different contracted 
service providers (architects, economists, label certification). For the financial management 
tasks, ALOGEA worked together with four different service providers and eight different 
institutional actors. The project leader reports that in general the partners have shown a 
strong will for cooperation. Given that ALOGEA is a small enterprise, there is however a 
very small number of staff foreseen for administrative work and financial management. The 
company does not have sufficient resources to finance a permanent team or service 
contractor for financial management and monitoring tasks. Nevertheless the project lead 
partner describes the efficiency of the partnership as satisfactory although not always 
perfectly coordinated. The project lead partner is also satisfied with the cooperation with 
the OP authorities except for the difficulty of reporting and financial management compared 
to the resources available.  
Source: case studies (interviews and questionnaires) 
Nonetheless, there were financial management, coordination and communication 
challenges in a number of cases, especially with regards to coordinating the necessary 
administrative requirements between the various partners involved and the OP 
administrators. Box 15: includes various explanations of project lead partner accounts on 
how the administrative burden increased as a result of involving many different partners. 
Box 15: Administrative burden hampering the cooperation with partners and OP 
authorities in projects: Examples from the case studies  
ETC OP Austria-Czech Republic: The objective of the “European Region Danube Vltava” 
project was to assess the existing cross-border networks of key players in the regional 
development system in three ETC programmes. While the Lead Partner was generally 
satisfied with the involvement of a large number of partners, a number of difficulties arose 
in the cooperation with the Czech partner regions mainly with regards to financial 
management, monitoring and evaluation. This is mainly due to the different administration 
structures and eligibility rules between the partners. There were also communication 
problems due to language barriers, although this was managed with the involvement of 
translators. The project Lead Partner was satisfied with the effectiveness of the cooperation 
with the OP authorities in the Project Implementation Phase and the Monitoring and 
Evaluation Phase, as well as with the opportunity to discuss arising issues with the MC 
members on an annual basis in the MC meetings. In all other phases however, the Lead 
Partner found the efficiency of cooperation with the OP authorities (concerning time, costs, 
possible administrative burden and delays) rather ineffective. The project application 
process is excessively formal and administratively complex. Each IB requires different 
descriptions of goals and milestones. The complex eligibility rules discourage project 
applicants, and the administration was hampered by the existence of three parts in the 
project, each tied with different timings and common costs that had to be split between the 
three ETC-programmes. Furthermore, the interests of the partners do not always coincide 
with the overall transnational project ideas. Finally, some partners were unable to provide 
the necessary information for each reporting period in time in sufficiently good quality. Poor 
financial management on the part of a few partners led to a delay of the finalisation of the 
project, which, in turn, delayed the transfer of the last tranche of the project budget by 
almost a year.  
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OP SRDP, Slovenia: The project “WEP – Water is Environmental Pearl” has the objective 
of improving flood protection and revitalising watercourses. Except for financial 
management tasks, the three partners, West-Transdanubian Directorate for Water 
Management from Hungary, the Municipality of Lendava and the Lead Partner (Eko-park 
d.o.o. Lendava, Slovenia), were all involved in all phases of the project cycle (application, 
selection, implementation, monitoring and reporting). The project Lead Partner found the 
overall cooperation with the project partners to be very efficient. In contrast, the 
cooperation with the OP authorities was rated as rather ineffective because it was highly 
time-consuming due to the number of administrative requirements. Of all OP 
representatives however, the cooperation with the MA was considered to be most efficient 
by the Project Lead Partner. The MA was available and helpful for the project 
representatives. According to the interviewee, the Project partners got all the support and 
advice needed while at the same time the MA was strict when it comes to abiding by the 
rules and regulations.  
OP Southern Finland: The project “Tetraedri - Technology transfer edges in regional 
innovations”, aims at supporting the adaptation of eco-efficient building and transportation 
models in urban planning. The project “ESYLEP” promotes environmental business in St. 
Petersburg and Northwest Russia for enterprises based in Southern Finland. Both projects 
involved partners from more than one region in the OP area. In both projects, the 
participation of a group of partners had advanced the achievement of the project goals. In 
contrast, the participation of these partners did not facilitate the project preparation and 
monitoring stages which were rather considered burdensome by the Lead Partner. One way 
to improve this would be to plan and budget co-operation activities already when preparing 
the projects. 
Source: case studies (interviews and questionnaires) 
5.4 Monitoring 
5.4.1 Composition of the MCs 
The main partnership mechanism for the monitoring of programmes is the MC. The 
composition of MCs is decided by the Member State and Managing Authority. While there is 
an expectation to include the full list of partners specified in the partnership principle, in 
practice there is discretion in the type and number of actors that are allocated 
places in the MCs. As illustrated in Table 6:6, the OPs do not always include formal 
representation from all types of partners. For instance in the OP North-Rhine Westphalia, 
the environmental and gender equality bodies as well as NGOs and civil society 
representatives are not present in the MC meetings according to the interviewees. The 
analysed ETC OPs are most striking in this respect as the representatives of thematic 
priority bodies, economic and social partners as well as representatives of the civil society 
are not present at all in the MCs. 
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Table 6: Composition of Monitoring Committees  
 
Public 
Thematic priority 
bodies 
Other 
OP Central Regional Local Environmental Gender Economic Social NGO’s 
/ civil 
Austria-
Czech 
Republic 
ETC 
√ √ √ X X X X X 
Alpine 
Space ETC 
√ √ X X X X X X 
Castilla y 
Leon 
√ √ √ √ √ √ √ X 
Languedoc-
Roussillon 
√ √ √ √ √ √ √ X 
North East 
England 
√ √ √ √ X √ √ √ 
North 
Rhine-
Westphalia 
√ √ √ X X √ √ X 
Silesia √ √ √ √ X √ √ √ 
Slovenia √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ 
Southern 
Finland 
√ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ 
Source: own elaboration based on case studies (interviews and questionnaires) 
Box 16: includes a few representative examples from the case studies to illustrate the 
aforementioned findings. 
Box 16: Composition of Monitoring Committees: Examples from the case studies 
OP ETC Alpine Space: The MC is composed of 2-3 representatives of each partner state’s 
programme authorities. It includes a representative of the MA as a full member; a 
representative of the European Commission as a member with advisory capacity; a 
representative of the JTS for technical support; representatives of transnational organised 
NGOs; and Alpine organisations and networks (specifically the Alpine Convention as 
irregular member with an advisory capacity).  
OP Castilla y Leon: The internal rules of the MC provides for the participation of 
‘permanent’ members (National and regional managing bodies, the evaluation unit, and 
environmental and gender equality bodies) and ‘advisory’ members (the Certifying 
Authority, representative from other EU Funds, the Commission, economic and social 
partners). The MC rules allow other civil society organisations and NGOs to be invited to the 
meetings, but this has not occurred in practice.  
OP North East England: The MC is chaired by the MA, with Commission advisors, 
government departments and representatives from all partners from various sectors: 
public, private, voluntary, trade union, environmental. Also, observers from the rural 
programme were included. The MA allocated one or two places to partner types and then 
asked them to nominate a representative of that sector to act as a delegate. It was then 
incumbent upon the sectors to organise themselves into electing somebody or select the 
processes that led to a person acting as their representative. In the case of the private 
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sector, the Northern Business Forum is the acknowledged representative in the North East, 
because it brings together the Federation for Small Business, Confederation of British 
Industry (CBI) and the Chamber of Commerce. They were invited to nominate their two 
representatives. Similarly there is an umbrella organisation for the voluntary sector for the 
North East, VONNE. The regional Trade Union Congress (TUC) represented the trade 
unions. From 20010, the representation from the private sector was strengthened and the 
representation from Local Economic Partnerships (LEPs) was added, which meant more 
private sector members. The local authorities from the outset were allocated 4 places but 
each of the 4 allocated members (elected councillors) was allowed to bring an officer to 
assist them.  
OP Southern Finland: The partners represented in the MC are Ministries (Ministry of 
Employment and the Economy, chair), Regional Councils, State regional authorities (ELY 
centres of Kaakkois-Suomi, Uusimaa), NGOs and interest organisations. The MC has a 
secretary with representatives of the Ministry of Employment and the Economy, all regional 
councils of Southern Finland and state administration. Compared to the programme period 
2000-06, the committee has a stronger regional representation.  
Source: case studies (interviews and questionnaires) 
5.4.2 Decision-making in the MCs 
The main tasks of the MC are specified in the General Regulation (Article 65):  
 
• approve project selection criteria and revisions;  
• review progress made towards achieving OP targets on the basis of documents 
submitted by the MA; 
• examine the results of implementation, particularly the achievement of the targets 
set for each priority axis and the evaluations;  
• approve the annual and final reports on implementation;  
• be informed of the annual control report; 
• propose revision or examination of the programme; and  
• approve OP amendments. 
 
The decisions taken in the Committee are usually adopted consensually rather than 
through formal voting procedures. For instance, while the Member States in the Alpine 
ETC OP have ‘one vote’ for all decisions, in practice they are taken by ‘consensus’. In 
Castilla y Leon, decisions are taken by consensus among the ‘permanent’ members. There 
is no formal voting system, but permanent and advisory members can express views on OP 
decisions and revisions during the meetings. Similarly, the Languedoc-Roussillon MC 
members do not having voting rights, but participate in the discussions. In the Southern 
Finland MC, the partners have a voting right although, in practice, the committee makes 
joint decisions by consensus without voting.  
 
By contrast, in two of the programmes analysed for this study, voting does take 
place: In Slovenia, the members of the MC have voting rights when it comes to changes of 
the OP, reports and plans, while in North Rhine-Westphalia formal votes are restricted to 
the annual decision approving the OP implementation report.  
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5.4.3 Advantages of the MC Structure for supporting MLG 
The main benefit of the MC from a MLG perspective is to support strategic dialogue 
among partners and contribute to a shared ownership of the programme. A few examples 
from the case studies are described in Box 17: to illustrate this statement. 
Box 17: Involvement of numerous partners in the MC increases shared ownership: 
Examples from the case studies  
OP North East England: One of the lessons learnt from previous MCs was to avoid the 
scenario where people just come together and moan about their sectoral representation. 
From the outset in the terms of reference it was made clear that MC members had a 
strategic obligation to the programme to make this work – a joint and shared responsibility 
for the strategic delivery of the programme. The intention of the MC/Local Management 
Committee (LMC) is to be discursive and strategic. Presentations are made to facilitate 
discussion and ownership of the programme.  
OP North Rhine-Westphalia: The level and quality of the debate and information about 
the performance of the OP is considered satisfactory by the Federal member. Active 
contribution to the monitoring process is possible and required – the ideas are taken on 
board as long as they are not judged to be individual, personal interests.  
OP SRDP, Slovenia: According to the MA, the MC meetings facilitate a better 
understanding and shared ownership of the OP objectives. It is also a widely appreciated 
opportunity for partners to voice their opinions and perspectives on the debated topics.  
OP Silesia: In the opinion of the Ministry of Regional Development, the participation of 
different partners facilitates a better understanding and increases the shared ownership of 
the OP objectives. Project beneficiaries are often part of the MC and make presentations in 
the meetings, which helps beneficiaries to understand the background of certain 
requirements. The Strategic and Spatial planning Department considers the meetings to be 
a good platform for acquiring and exchanging information as well as giving all involved 
partners (also social and economic partners) the possibility for sharing their views. The 
meetings are not perceived to be dominated by the members’ own interests and agendas.  
OP Southern Finland: The involvement of partners in the MC enables information 
exchange between the European Commission and partners and thus facilitates the 
information flow in the regions. The OP has broad objectives, which require a broad range 
of expertise in the MC. Further, the strong presentation of the regions in the committee has 
improved the commitment of the regions.  
Source: case studies (interviews and questionnaires) 
5.4.4 Critical views of the partnership principle in the MC 
More negative views were also expressed about the nature of the dialogue in MC 
committees and the decision-making process: 
 
• Lack of strategic dialogue and technical focus. A member of the Languedoc-
Roussillon MC criticised the meetings for being a “platform for presenting 
information on statistics” rather than a platform for debate. More fruitful exchanges 
often take place in the informal discussions preceding the official sessions. According 
to the Languedoc-Roussillon MA, the participants in the MC often seem to be present 
because they are obliged to since “active participation is lacking”. In the opinion of 
the MA, this is because the issues discussed in the MC meetings are too technical 
and too complex. Respondents from Southern Finland also noted that most of the 
issues discussed are of a technical nature.  
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• Limited influence on decisions. An MC member in Slovenia noted that the MC 
serves as a platform for approving pre-decided issues or addressing compliance 
problems rather than facilitating a better understanding and shared ownership of OP 
objectives. The interviewee argues that most important issues are in any case 
decided outside of the monitoring meetings and the MC members cannot actually 
influence decision outcomes. Similarly, in Castilla y Leon and Southern Finland, 
there are some doubts over the actual capability of the MC to influence OP 
implementation because the EU and national regulations set a tight framework for 
the content and delivery of programmes. In North Rhine-Westphalia, the secretariat 
noted that decisions are taken at the political level while the MC merely agrees 
these formal decisions.  
• Organisational challenges. The involvement of multiple partners can increase the 
complexity of the meetings and hamper decision-making processes because of the 
heterogeneity of MC members and interests (OP ETC Austria-Czech Republic, OP 
ETC Alpine Space, OP Languedoc-Roussillon, OP North Rhine-Westphalia, OP 
Silesia). 
5.4.5 The role of the MC in increasing communication between partners 
The MC meetings and outputs - such as implementation reports - are widely appreciated as 
a valuable accountability tool for exchanging information on OP implementation outcomes. 
Information is widely disseminated and the minutes of meetings are usually available to 
members, although the minutes are not usually disseminated to other stakeholders that are 
not represented in the committees or available to the public online. A few examples from 
the case studies are described in Box 18: to illustrate this statement. 
Box 18: Disseminating information through the MC: Examples from the case 
studies 
OP ETC Austria-Czech Republic: The programme website contains all important 
information, but the outcomes of the MC meetings are not published. In the words of the 
representative of the MA: “transparency in Austria is not as high as in Sweden”. The MC 
meetings are held at least three times a year. After the MC meetings, the JTS writes up the 
draft minutes and disseminates it to the participants. All participants have the right to send 
any comments on the document. After the revision, the final minutes are available in the 
internal programme database. The interviewee from the Control Body states that since the 
outcomes of the MC meetings are not publically accessible, there is a lack of information 
dissemination about difficult projects which hampers the Control Body’s work.  
OP Castilla y Leon: According to the regional secretariat and environmental body, a large 
amount of information is shared with all participants, which contributes to improving the 
understanding of the OP and improving relations with the management bodies, e.g. when 
seeking information from the implementing bodies for reporting purposes.  
OP North Rhine-Westphalia: In the view of the Secretariat, all partners are satisfied with 
the process. The reporting and delivery of data is well established and works to the MA 
satisfaction. The minutes of the MC meetings as well as the dissemination of the AIRs and 
the evaluations are valuable instruments as they offer detailed information about the 
implementation of the OP and single projects. The representative of the MC points out that 
the minutes of the MC meetings are only distributed to the MC members and not published 
for other stakeholders online. In his opinion, debates could be improved by providing 
information earlier and more coherently. Not all information about the performance of the 
OP and the project selection results are available in a transparent way. According to an 
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interviewee, the participation in the MC meetings contributes to an improved knowledge of 
the partners that they can then forward on to clients.  
Source: case studies (interviews and questionnaires) 
Nevertheless, there are challenges in collecting monitoring data in a MLG setting. 
For instance, the Castilla y Leon regional managing body noted that national and regional 
bodies sometimes used different indicators for the same priorities which cannot therefore 
be aggregated and leads to a proliferation in indicators. There are also variations in the 
effort placed on monitoring and the interpretation of indicators by different implementing 
bodies and beneficiaries, a challenge also faced in the Southern Finland OP.  
 
Finally, there are other structures and networks outside of the MCs that can also 
contribute to MLG goals. In Languedoc-Roussillon, there is more active participation from 
OP partners in thematic seminars and trainings (e.g. training on JEREMIE with 
representatives of the banking and financial sector) than in MC meetings. In the Alpine ETC 
OP, there is regular consultation and interaction between the different partners through 
annual events organised by the managing bodies. In Spain, there are several thematic 
networks which operate at the national level and include representation from all of the 
regions. The gender equality and environmental networks already existed in the previous 
period, but additional networks have been created for 2007-2013 on the themes of 
local/urban development, R&D and innovation and social inclusion.  
5.5 Evaluation 
The Cohesion Policy requirements on evaluation have become more flexible for 2007-2013. 
Obligatory mid-term evaluation was replaced with ongoing needs-based evaluation to 
assess performance and react to external changes. Operational evaluations are triggered 
automatically when difficulties are revealed by monitoring systems and in order to justify 
programme revisions. While evaluations have been undertaken for most of the OPs 
during the 2007-2013 period, none have assessed MLG arrangements or the 
partnership principle.  
 
The main forum for the involvement of partners in evaluation is the MC. As noted in the 
previous section, one of the tasks of the MCs is to examine the evaluations during the 
implementation of the programme. Evaluation reports are often discussed in the meetings 
and must be summarised in the annual implementation reports, which keep the partnership 
informed about evaluation developments and provide a forum for discussing OP 
achievements (OP ETC Austria-Czech Republic, OP Castilla y Leon, OP Silesia, OP SRDP 
Slovenia). However, some of interviewees consider these discussions to be limited or 
superficial (OP NRW, OP SRDP Slovenia). 
 
Dedicated evaluation committees and networks have been established in several of 
the OPs reviewed, but the membership of these groups is usually restricted to government 
Ministries, departments and MAs rather than the boarder partnership of OP stakeholders. 
For instance, in Spain, a Strategic Reporting and Evaluation Advisory Committee is 
responsible for the coordination of the evaluation and strategic reporting activity for all 
Spanish OPs. It is composed of the national and regional programme managers, enjoys 
European Commission representation and covers the the ERDF, CF and ESF. Economic and 
social partners or civil society/NGO groups are not represented in the committee. Similar 
evaluation committees at national or regional level can be seen in various other cases (e.g. 
OP SRDP Slovenia, OP Southern Finland, OP Languedoc-Roussillon).  
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In a minority of cases there are committees with a wider management remit and a 
broader partnership composition that discuss the evaluations undertaken. In North East 
England, evaluations are discussed with partners through the PEG and LMC committees, 
while the Southern Finland regional management committees play a similar role.  
 
Additional tools for disseminating evaluation results are: 
 
• Internet sites: Evaluation reports are published and disseminated online in most 
cases through the OP and MA websites, as well as through online blogs (OP ETC 
Alpine Space) and newsletters (OP Languedoc-Roussillon).  
• Evaluation events: The Southern Finland OP MA organises ‘evaluation days’ in 
which all relevant partners involved in the programme implementation can discuss 
evaluation reports and results.  
An assessment of Multilevel Governance in Cohesion Policy 2007-2013 
 
 
53 
 
6 OUTLOOK, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
6.1 Future Plans for Multi-Level Governance in Cohesion Policy 
in the Member States 
Preparations for the future round of 2014-2020 Partnership Agreement and programmes 
are underway across all EU Member States. Extensive processes of consultation and 
evaluation are taking place at sub-national, national and transnational levels. For 
instance, the ETC OP Alpine Space has organised a programme of workshops in all 
languages spoken in the Alpine Space as well as an online survey. A report was published 
under the responsibility of a team of six experts from different alpine countries in May 
2013, showing a broad participation process which was judged as very successful. At the 
regional level, the North East England MA has put aside money for local partners to bid into 
post-2014 preparatory work. This has allowed LEPs, local partners, universities and the 
financial instruments community to support significant research, helping to shape their 
proposals for the new programme. A public consultation on the draft OP for Languedoc-
Roussillon has been launched to seek the views of the départements and civil society.   
 
Major shifts in the policy architecture are planned in some cases with important 
implications for the national-regional balance of MLG in Cohesion Policy.  
 
In fact, the French regions will gain in independence from the government and the role of 
the préfectures is becoming increasingly unclear. The ERDF will be fully decentralised. In 
order to obtain a more strategic approach, the regions are considering the option of 
creating a multi-fund approach combining the ESF, ERDF and EAFRD (European Agricultural 
Funds for Rural Development) at regional level. As MA responsibilities will be fully devolved, 
the national government will only have a coordinating role. From then on, The Region will 
be corresponding with the European Commission and the DATAR, in contrast to the Préfet.  
Poland is also taking a further step towards the decentralization of programming: around 
60% of the financial allocation will now be transferred to the regional programmes, which 
seems to be a new challenge for the national Ministry as well as for the regions.  
 
By contrast, in Finland a more centralised approach is planned. There will be only one 
national multi-fund programme combining the ERDF and ESF and it will be implemented in 
two regions (Northern and Eastern Finland, Western and Southern Finland). There are 
concerns about this leading to a centralised model with less involvement from other actors 
in the design and implementation of the programme: economic and social partners have 
expressed strong concerns; the role of the regional plans feeding into the OPs is unclear; 
and there will be only one MC.  
 
Shifts in the thematic orientation also have implications for partnership. Given the 
higher concentration of the programme in the next programming period 2014-2020, the MC 
member, interviewed in the ETC OP Austria-Czech Republic, expects that there will be 
fewer difficulties in accommodating and managing partner expectations. In Languedoc-
Roussillon, the MA argued that in order for the partners to be better involved, the thematic 
concentration of the OP must be precise enough to clarify which partners are most relevant 
to the development of the programme. On the other hand, a representative of the MC 
committee argued that thematic concentration will make it difficult to take on board the 
opinions and interests of a large number of partners, especially given the stark differences 
between the territories of the region. This, in turn, will result in a misrepresentation of the 
region. Similarly, in Southern Finland there is concern about how to ensure that the 
cooperation between counties and the shared development vision, having formed under 
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Priority 5, will continue in the next period as similar projects are not possible in the new 
programme. The Priority 5 has been considered very progressive and successful and the 
projects beneficiaries see this co-operation as very beneficial.  
6.2 Lessons learned about Multi-Level Governance in Cohesion 
Policy from the Member States 
6.2.1 Involvement of numerous and various partners across the policy phases  
Looking at the case studies carried out for this study, it is clear that the partnership 
requirement is respected and implemented consistently across the policy phases. Wherever 
the involvement of the various types of partners is handled “well” (according to the 
interviewees), the impact on policy implementation is generally effective.  
 
However, it can also be noted that across all policy phases, the key OP authorities 
(government bodies at national or regional level) do not only take the final decisions as 
required, but they tend to only “formally” involve other partners, such as the civil society. 
 
In the Preparation of the OP, participation is most inclusive. In the preparation phase a 
very large number of different partners have been consulted in complex processes in all 
OPs examined in this study. This is also in line with the findings from previous studies as 
described in Chapter 4.3. (e.g. Hooghe 1996). Still, while in the opinion of the OP 
authorities other partners were effectively involved, the interviewed OP partners usually 
disagreed, arguing that their opinions and ideas were not sufficiently integrated in the final 
documents.  
 
In the Project Selection phase as well as OP Management phase, the Case Study 
analysis reveals that the key actors are the OP authorities and the tasks are carried out 
exclusively by the Certifying Authority and the Managing Authority (at national or regional 
level). This finding differs from those of previous studies (e.g. Hooghe 1996), which have 
not assessed the distribution of competences in the financial management, audit and 
control functions, suggesting that there is  greater centralisation than is assumed in the 
literature with respect to MA, Certifying Authority and Audit Authority tasks.  
 
When it comes to Monitoring and Evaluation, the MC should – by definition – include all 
relevant partners in order for them to influence the decisions through their active 
participation. However, the case studies have shown that those partners are not always 
represented in the MC meetings in practice (e.g. the ETC OPs Alpine Space and Austria-
Czech Republic). In certain OPs some specific bodies are missing in the MC (e.g. the MC of 
the OP North-Rhine Westphalia lacks environmental and gender equality bodies; and the 
MC of the OP Castilla y Leon does not include civil society groups). While in the majority of 
the OPs these bodies and partners are formally given different opportunities to participate 
in the meetings (discussions, voting, etc.), many interviewed MC members described their 
true influence as being limited and the reason for their presence merely a “formality”. The 
discussions in the MC meetings are considered to be superficial because the key issues 
seem to be often pre-decided.  
6.2.2 The trade off between MLG and the effectiveness and efficiency of Cohesion Policy 
The theoretical advantages of MLG in the existing literature have been empirically 
confirmed by the findings from the case studies carried out in this study. These generally 
include: perceived increases in legitimacy of the policies as they are increasingly tailored 
to reflect the heterogeneous preferences of the partners involved; a more informed 
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policy-making process through the participation of numerous partners (additional 
expertise, innovation and learning); increased commitment and ownership; more 
transparent decision-making processes and overall increased effectiveness in OP 
development and project selection.   
 
The problems and difficulties affecting the trade-off between MLG and the effectiveness 
and efficiency of Cohesion Policy reported in the literature are – in general terms – in line 
with the findings from the case studies. In general, MLG has been criticised for increasing 
the complexity, blurring the responsibility and creating joint decision-traps. The 
critiques resulting from the existing literature about MLG  are also largely in line with the 
problems analysed from the case studies carried out for this Study – with the exception of 
the criticism that in Central and Eastern European countries the partnership principle is 
applied to a lesser extent compared to other EU Member States. In fact, in comparison to 
the other OPs examined in ‘older’ Member States, the OP Silesia in Poland and the OP SRDP 
in Slovenia seem to have internalised the partnership principle well and – at least according 
to the interviewees – have contributed to the effectiveness of Cohesion Policy.  
 
Table 7:7 summarises the positive and negative features of MLG in each policy phase as 
well as the instruments and methods used for ensuring the effective application of 
partnership.  
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Table 7: Summary of the positive and negative features of MLG across Policy Phases resulting from the case studies 
Positive Positive features Mechanisms for ensuring the 
effective application of MLG 
Negative features 
Preparation 
of the OP 
• Buy-in, Consensus 
• Collective ownership 
• Additional expertise 
• Pre-existing culture of cooperation 
• Clear division of competences 
• Adequate planning 
 
• Vested interests of partners 
• Strategic dialogue insufficiently 
possible due to existing structures 
• Administrative capacity and 
coordination constraints 
Project 
Selection 
• Formal requirement for MC to allow 
for key partners to discuss project 
selection criteria 
• At project level, the preparation of 
the project must be informed and 
supported by various partners 
(expertise, additional resources, 
etc.) 
• Ensuring that MC gives sufficient 
space for discussions  and 
participation 
• Limited influence of partners 
(especially NGOs and civil society) in 
project selection 
• At project level, large partnerships 
can cause additional administrative 
burden (formal bureaucratic 
requirements causing delays) 
• Some OPs do not include or 
prioritise multi-partner projects   
OP 
management 
• Contribution to effective 
management and policy coordination 
• Improving commitment and OP 
ownership 
• Ensuring the representation of all 
partners 
• At project level, the support of 
various partners and OP authorities 
is essential and effective 
• Information exchange 
• Training 
• Diffusing/separating management 
responsibilities 
• Coordination challenges 
• Responsibility shifting 
• Administrative burden 
• At project level, the involvement of 
a large number of heterogeneous 
partners increases difficulties in 
financial management, coordination 
and communication 
Monitoring • Support strategic dialogue among • Formal representation of partners in • Uneven representation of partners, 
An assessment of Multilevel Governance in Cohesion Policy 2007-2013 
 
 
57 
 
 Positive features Mechanisms for ensuring the 
effective application of MLG 
Negative features 
partners in the MC 
• Increase of shared ownership 
through active participation, voicing 
of interests and opinions 
• Information exchange 
committees 
• Dissemination of information 
material about the OP (AIRs, 
evaluations, minutes of the meetings 
sometimes do not include the key 
partners highlighted in the 
partnership principle 
• Lack of strategic dialogue and strong 
technical focus in MC meetings (no 
active debates; presentation of 
complex technical content) 
• Limited influence on important 
decisions in MC (“discussing pre-
defined issues”) 
• Organisational challenges due to 
heterogeneity of multiple partners 
• Other platforms are often more 
appreciated than MC 
Evaluation • More flexible Cohesion Policy 
requirements for evaluations 
compared to the past tailored to 
need 
• Presentation and discussion of 
evaluations at MC  meetings 
• Dedicated evaluation committees 
and networks 
• Internet 
• Events 
• Discussion about evaluations in the 
MC are limited and superficial 
• Evaluations rarely assess MLG 
arrangements or the partnership 
principle 
Source: case studies (interviews and questionnaires) 
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6.3 Findings and recommendations 
In this final section, the challenges and lessons learned in this study are summarised and 
accompanied by recommendations: 
 
1. Despite the perceived intensification of the partnership principle in the OPs, 
decision-making is in practice still dominated by a top-down perspective.  
The role of the European Commission has evolved over time from regulatory compliance to 
the strategic coordination level. In the next period, the power of the Commission in 
programming has been reinforced in the post-2013 period through ring-fencing and ex-ante 
conditionality requirements. Also, in the OPs the decisions are made by the key players 
(government authorities at national and/or regional levels) and are merely informed by the 
local level. These top-down processes arguably marginalise democratic institutions and 
reduce the legitimacy of MLG in Cohesion Policy rather than the other way around. 
 
At the same time, the European Commission should further act as a supporting and 
advising entity.  In North-East England, there is close collaboration between the MA, local 
partnerships and departments at the national level but also with Commission desk officers. 
The MA felt that the link with the Commission was a very important relationship and that it 
would be important to find a way to preserve that in the future programme. The link with 
the Commission was important for understanding what they were looking for from a 
programme, but also making the DG REGIO staff aware of the needs of the region and how 
things work on the ground. Whenever desk officers visit, the partnership makes a point of 
showing them some projects and creating time for informal discussions between the 
Commission and partners. Looking forward, an interviewee in Languedoc-Roussillon argues 
that the Commission could place more effort on the sharing of good practices on MLG and 
the involvement of partners across countries and OPs.  
 
In order to avoid a further strengthening of top-down approaches, there is a need to plan 
sufficient time for early engagement with all partners and stakeholders.  As argued 
by the regional environmental authority of the Castilla y Leon OP, a greater level of 
strategic dialogue is needed with the wider partnership in the preparatory phases of 
programming prior to the formulation of draft OPs and selection of priorities and 
interventions. In North-East England, the MA took the view that the engagement of 
partners from the outset has been absolutely critical to the operation of the programme. 
The programme seems to be broadly on track, despite the upheavals in the region. There 
seems to be indeed a strong relationship across the partnership. There is a strong feeling of 
ownership in the programme. Similarly, in North Rhine-Westphalia, the MC representative 
holds the view that improvements are needed in terms of communication at an early stage 
of the programming process. A more dialogue-oriented OP preparation phase upon the 
initiative of the MA is needed, including round table meetings with regional and local 
practitioners to share the day-to-day experiences with existing programmes and rules at an 
early stage.  
 
Interestingly, the research has shown that some (regional) programmes do not prioritise 
partnership-working at the project level. In fact, neither in the OP North Rhine-
Westphalia nor the OP Castilla y Leon have the MAs been able to identify projects in 
collaboration with more than one partner. This shows that the partnership principle is not 
taken to all levels of programme implementation. 
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Recommendations: 
The European Parliament should encourage the European Commission to offer more 
technical support to OP authorities in order to facilitate partnerships (e.g. trainings) as 
well as disseminate good practices. In order to do so, the key is for the European 
Commission to continuously follow the developments “on the ground” in order to truly 
grasp the circumstances and the difficulties of involving numerous, different, partners in 
the OPs. Eventually, this will help the European institutions to develop comprehensive 
solutions to ensure that MLG contributes to the effectiveness of Cohesion Policy diminishing 
any trade-off. 
The EU Institutions should encourage the increase of transparency of partnership 
functioning. The contributions of the various partners involved should be visible and it 
should become possible to understand on what basis decisions in the OPs are being made. 
The OP structure and divisions of tasks should be decided in the OP preparation phase in 
order for all partners to have a clear understanding of the structures and avoid 
responsibility shifting.  
The European Parliament should ensure that sufficient time is planned for an early 
engagement with all partners and stakeholders especially at the outset of a new 
programming period. The European Commission should monitor that these participatory 
processes remain informative without putting additional administrative pressure on the OP 
authorities. 
The EU institutions should seek to promote partnership not merely at OP level but also at 
project level. These partnerships should go beyond Community-Led Local Development 
and the Territorial Cooperation initiatives. 
 
2. While MLG is key to increasing the effectiveness of Cohesion Policy, an over-
representation of actors, which are not accountable to the groups represented, 
is counter-productive.   
For the future programming period of 2014-2020, the focus in some of the OPs analysed in 
this study will be on ensuring that partnerships remain manageable, focused and 
informed. The ETC OP Austria-Czech Republic interviewees were satisfied overall with the 
programming process and would prefer to keep the number of partners to a necessary 
minimum, although involving wide consultation. Similarly, the OP ETC Alpine Space MA is 
satisfied with the current arrangements and does not see any need for future 
improvements. There are “mixed” opinions on the involvement of numerous (and different) 
partners in the OP. While the benefits of MLG are acknowledged, discussions with 
uninformed partners can be “tiring and inefficient”. The Languedoc-Roussillon MA agrees 
that partners must be better informed about the functioning of EU funds in general as well 
as the functioning of the ERDF and the OP in specific. This can be achieved through specific 
trainings for social and economic partners.  
 
While partnership should continuously be encouraged and supported, there is a need to 
avoid unclear structures, diffusing management responsibilities and responsibility shifting. 
Recommendations: 
The inclusiveness of partnership should be ensured and monitored by the European 
Commission. However, the European Parliament should inform the European Commission 
that OP authorities should be able to target and consult those partners whom they 
consider to be most relevant for the tasks and issues at stake.  
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This will be facilitated through the higher thematic concentration of the OPs in the next 
programming period 2014-2020. The European Commission must however ensure that 
through the thematic concentration the heterogeneity of the regions is still respected and 
the varying opinions are taken on board. 
There is a need for more partnership in the OP management phase and evaluation 
strategies planning, as these phases are currently dominated by the MA. The European 
Parliament should ask the European Commission to offer enough support for ensuring that 
active participation is encouraged, possibly through a targeted consultation of relevant 
stakeholders for specific topics or issues (e.g. thematic seminars or electronic 
consultations). 
In order to facilitate the active participation of various actors in the OP implementation, the 
level of knowledge about the ESI-funds in general and the OP in particular should be 
comparable for all relevant stakeholders involved. The European Parliament and the 
European Commission should therefore encourage trainings for all partners involved 
at OP level, possibly by thematic field (e.g. environment, innovation, etc) or technical 
issue (e.g. regulations, eligibility rules, etc.). 
 
3. The involvement of more partners of different types increases the 
administrative burden and bureaucratic complexity of policy-making. In 
combination with the lack of resources experienced by many partners (especially for the 
civil society and NGOs, most importantly at project level), this hampers an effective 
participation or influence on OP design and implementation. 
From a management perspective, there is a tension between involving a wide 
number of delivery bodies and administrative efficiency.  In North Rhine-Westphalia, 
there are plans to reduce the number of Intermediate Bodies to facilitate OP administration 
as well as improving quality management at the MA level. The number of Intermediate 
Bodies has been a central part of the debate on the discussions of administrative structures 
and MLG in Finland. There have been discussions about whether regional councils should 
have the role of Intermediate Bodies in addition to the state regional administration. A 
recent evaluation of the administrative system of the Finnish ERDF programmes in 2012 
found that the cooperation between different actors involved in the programme works well 
generally, although there are variations in funding decisions, guidance, procedures and 
requirements of intermediate bodies. In France, one of the interviewees has called for a 
single Ministry to be responsible for the Funds in order to minimise blame and responsibility 
shifting.  
 
Effective communication is clearly important for successful OP administration. 
According to the MA of the ETC OP Austria-Czech Republic, the OP’s success is based upon 
the confidence and familiarity of the actors involved, which is why communication is a key 
aspect. The process must be output-oriented, constructive within a restricted timeframe 
and allow for flexible adaptations over time. In Silesia, a project leader considers that OP 
authorities should better communicate the rules and procedures, especially the eligibility 
rules to beneficiaries.  
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Recommendations: 
The European Parliament should ask the European Commission to find common solutions 
together with OP authorities for offering more technical support to partners. Information 
and knowledge gaps should be reduced in order for the partners to work with the same 
type and level of information. Possible solutions include focusing increasingly on the 
coordination within the OP partnership as well as an increased assistance with 
administrative tasks.  
The communication between the OP authorities and the programme partners must be 
improved in order to ensure that all relevant stakeholders develop a familiarity with the 
programme and get a feeling of ownership. The European Commission should develop 
concrete models of communication based on good practice examples (such as the OPs 
described above). 
 
4. Although partnership is welcome by all actors involved, the case studies show that the 
MC is generally not viewed as the best platform for shaping decision-making 
processes.  
MCs play an important accountability role in the use of the Structural Funds but the 
composition of the committees is not always representative of all types of 
partners and the quality of debate and information provided on programme 
performance varies. In terms of composition, there is little representation of the civil 
society and NGOs in some cases.  
 
More intensified partnership-working is planned or would be welcomed for different types of 
partners and through various channels. The MC representative in the Alpine ETC OP calls 
for the improvement in the involvement of socio-economic partners and representatives of 
civil society in OP implementation, e.g. through regular web consultations, invitation to 
meetings, specific monitoring and surveys, etc. The DATAR representative in France argues 
that public consultations should become obligatory and systematic and should therefore be 
more flexible for involving partners. While there was overall satisfaction in Silesia and 
Slovenia, both MAs wish to intensify efforts in 2014-2020 based on the lessons learned. 
This would be welcomed by the Slovenian MC member, an NGO that hopes to be taken 
“more seriously” in the future and wishes for a closer cooperation with the MA. In Castilla y 
Leon, differentiated working arrangements are considered useful for involving different 
partners in accordance with their responsibilities and needs, but it seems that targeted 
measures may be needed for involving non-governmental actors and civil society. Regional 
environmental bodies, in turn, should be granted a greater role in the SEA process. 
 
Recommendations: 
The European Parliament should address the issue of the workings in the MC with the 
European Commission. Although formally the partnership is highly inclusive, decisions 
cannot be influenced. It thus seems that there is little space for active participation for 
partners aside from approving completed documents (AIRs, evaluations, etc). 
An ‘over-crowding’ of the MCs should also be avoided as the participation of 
programme partners has been qualified as a deposition of vested interests.  Therefore, the 
European Parliament should inform the European Commission of these developments in 
order for the latter to encourage OP authorities to introduce other channels and 
platforms in addition to the MC meetings. These platforms should be targeted only at 
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relevant stakeholders and possibly tackle specific topics (e.g. thematic trainings or 
seminars). 
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ANNEX 1 LIST OF INTERVIEWEES 
 
Table 8: Selection of case study OPs, projects and interviewees 
OP Name MS 
Objectiv
e 
Interviewees 
OP North Rhine-
Westphalia ERDF 
DE RCE • MA: Objective 2 Secretariat North Rhine-
Westphalia, Claudia Schulte, head of 
department, conducted on 17.07.2013 
• Vertical Partner - national department for 
EU Cohesion Policy and EU Funds: Federal 
Ministry of Economics and Technology, Karin 
Scheffel, head of division EU Cohesion Policy 
and EU Funds for Regional Development, 
conducted on 04.07.2013 
• MC member: Region Köln/Bonn e.V. 
(Regional Development Agency) Dr. Reimar 
Molitor, Managing Director and MC member, 
questionnaire from 31.07.2013 
For this case study it was not possible to find 
appropriate interview partners on the part of 
projects. Neither the Secretariat nor the 
interviewed MC member could help out by 
forwarding contacts. Additionally, every attempt 
to contact a project directly via contact 
information on the objective-2 website was not 
successful.  
OP North-East England UK RCE • MA: Iain Derrick, Department of Communities 
and Local Government, 15.7.2013 
• Vertical partner: Heather Smith, European 
Funding Officer, Northumberland County 
Council (Observer at LMC and member of PEG) 
26.8.2013 
• Project Lead Partner: Jo Thornton, Deputy 
CEO, Generator, 2.9.2013. 
OP Southern Finland FI RCE • MA: Harri Ahlgren, Senior Inspector, Ministry 
of Employment and the Economy. Phone 
interview 12.08.2013. 
• Vertical Partner: Mari Kuparinen (2013) 
Coordinator of Southern Finland OP, Regional 
Council of Päijät-Häme. Phone interview 
3.07.2013. 
• MC member: Juha Haapaniemi (2013). Mayor 
of Kymenlaakso Region and a member of 
Southern Finland OP Monitoring Committee. 
Phone interview 8.08.2013 
• Project Leader 1: Vesa Ijäs, project Leader 
of project “tetraedri”, Ladec oy. 21.8.2013 
• Project Leader 2: Carola Wictorsson, project 
leader of project ESYLEP, Culminatum Oy. 
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OP Name MS 
Objectiv
e 
Interviewees 
22.8.2013 
OP Castilla y Leon ES RCE • MA: Francisca Fernandez, Administrator, DG 
EU Funds, Castilla Leon regional government, 
intermediate body (IB) with some delegated 
managing authority responsibilities 19.7.13 
• Horizontal partner: Jesús Ángel Diez 
Vázquez, Programme Director of the Natural 
Heritage Foundation of Castilla y León, 
environment authority 6.18.13 
• MC member: Sonia Martinez, Member of a 
business sector confedration (Confederación 
de Organizaciones Empresariales de Castilla y 
León - CECALE) 30.09.13 
For this case study, the project promoter of the 
urban project referred to in the case study 
refused to answer the questionnaire (after initially 
agreeing). The project promoter argued that he is 
in the project lead and does not cooperate with 
any other partners, so the questions were not 
considered to be relevant. The regional MA was 
also unable to identify a single project that 
involved collaboration between more than one 
partner.  
OP Languedoc-Roussillon FR RCE • MA: Stéphane Nguyen, MA OP Languedoc-
Roussillon, Conseil Régional Languedoc-
Roussillon, 17.07.2013 
• Vertical Partner - DATAR: Mickael Vaillant, 
French Regional Development Policy Agency 
DATAR, National Coordination of Structural 
Funds OPs, 18.07.2013 
• MC member: Florent Martiche, MC member, 
Conseil Général des Pyrénées-Orientales,  Pôle 
Europe / Affaires transfrontalières, 2.08.2013 
• Project Lead Partner : David Spanghero & 
Baptiste Raymond, ALOGEA, Responsible for 
the Management Service of the Energy, 
sustainable development and rehabilitation 
services, Aude (Languedoc-Roussillon), 
21.08.2013 
OP Silesia  PL CON • MA: Malgorzata Stas, Managing Authority, 
Director of the Regional Devalopment 
Department, Marshall Office Silesia 
Voivodeship, 19.07.2013 
• Vertical Partner - Coordinating Unit at 
National Authority: Kinga Nowopolska, Chief 
specialist at the Department of Coordination of 
the regional programmes, Ministry of Regional 
Development, 12.08.2013 
• MC member: Mariusz Raczek, MC member, 
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OP Name MS 
Objectiv
e 
Interviewees 
Vice-Director of the Strategic and Spatial 
planning Department, Marshall Office Silesia 
Voivodeship, 19.07.2013 
• Project Lead Partner: Magdalena Ciuk, 
project leader of the project “e-Myszkovia. 
Rozwój elektronicznych usług publicznych  
w Powiecie Myszkowskim”, Powiat Myszkow 
(Starostwo Powiatowe w Myszkowie), 
26.07.2013 
OP Strengthening the 
regional development 
potentials, Slovenia 
SI CON • MA: Ministry of economic development and 
technology, Iba Zupancic, Head of 
Department, Managing Authority, interview 
conducted on 09.08.2013 
• Horizontal Partner – Certifying Authority: 
Ministry of Finance, Mateja Mahkovec, Head of 
Certifying Authority, interview conducted on 
19.07.2013 
• MC member: Focus Association for 
Sustainable Development, NGO, Lidija Živčič, 
Senior Expert in Focus, MC member, 
Questionnaire from 17.07.2013 
• Project Lead Partner: Eko-park d.o.o. 
Lendava, Branka Bensa, project manager of 
the project “WEP – Water is Environmental 
Pearl, Protection and management of natural 
water resources through revitalization, land 
development and stimulation of public 
awareness”, questionnaire from 06.08.2013 
OP Austria – Czech 
Republic 
AT-SK/ 
AT-CZ 
ETC • MA: Amt der niederösterreichischen 
Landesregierung/ department of state 
government Lower Austria, Managing 
Authority of the AT-CZ cross-border 
cooperation programme, Bernhard Köhle, 
Head of Managing Authority, 05.07.2013 
• Vertical Partner - Czech National 
Authority: Ministry of Regional development 
of the Czech Republic, Czech National 
Authority of the AT-CZ cross-border 
cooperation programme, Věra Korkischová, 
Officer, 04.07.2013 
• Horizontal Partner - Control Body: 
Viennese Government, Municipal Department 
27 – European Affairs, control of expenditure, 
Control Body, Gabriele Springinklee, vice-chair 
department control of expenditure (FLC), 
11.07.2013 
• MC member: Regional Management Upper 
Austria, MC Member Wilhelm Patri, 
representative of the region, 19.07.2013 
• Project Lead Partner: Office of State 
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OP Name MS 
Objectiv
e 
Interviewees 
Government of Upper Austria, Department for 
Regional and Spatial Planning, Günther Knötig, 
project lead partner European Region Danube 
Vltava, 23.07.2013 
OP Alpine Space Alpine 
Space(AT
, FR, DE, 
IT, LI, 
CH, SI) 
ETC • MA: Land Salzburg, Managing Authority of the 
OP Alpine Space, Christian Salletmaier, Head 
of Managing Authority, 15.07.2013 
• Horizontal partner (NGO): CIPRA 
International, autonomous non-governmental, 
non-profit umbrella organisation to the 
protection and sustainable development of the 
Alps since 1952, Wolfgang Pfefferkorn, project 
partner or sub-contractor, 19.07.2013 
• MC member: Department for Development 
and Cohesion Policy, Rossella Rusca, MC 
member, 19.07.2013 
• Expert opinion: Pfefferkorn, Wolfgang, 
Consultant at Rosinak & Partner, 19.07.2013 
• Project Lead Partner 1: Umweltbundesamt, 
Jochen Bürgel and Wolfgang Lexer, project 
lead partner CLISP – Climate Change 
Adaptation by Spatial Planning in the Alpine 
Space, 19.07.2013 
• Project Lead Partner 2: Swiss Center for 
Mountain Regions, Peter Niederer, Project 
Manager ACCESS – Improving accessibility of 
services of general interest – organisational 
innovations in rural mountain areas, 
06.08.2013 
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ANNEX 2 CASE STUDIES 
 
Attached in a separate document to this study. 
 
